Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):279-294 (2008)
Why do our intuitive knowledge ascriptions shift when a subject's practical interests are mentioned? Many efforts to answer this question have focused on empirical linguistic evidence for context sensitivity in knowledge claims, but the empirical psychology of belief formation and attribution also merits attention. The present paper examines a major psychological factor (called ?need-for-closure?) relevant to ascriptions involving practical interests. Need-for-closure plays an important role in determining whether one has a settled belief; it also influences the accuracy of one's cognition. Given these effects, it is a mistake to assume that high- and low-stakes subjects provided with the same initial evidence are perceived to enjoy belief formation that is the same as far as truth-conducive factors are concerned. This mistaken assumption has underpinned contextualist and interest-relative invariantist treatments of cases in which contrasting knowledge ascriptions are elicited by descriptions of subjects with the same initial information and different stakes. The paper argues that intellectualist invariantism can easily accommodate such cases
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References found in this work BETA
Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.
Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons.Stewart Cohen - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):57-89.
The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions.John MacFarlane - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 197--234.
Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and Knowledge of Knowledge.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):213–235.
Citations of this work BETA
Philosophical Expertise and the Burden of Proof.Timothy Williamson - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (3):215-229.
Empirical tests of interest-relative invariantism.Chandra Sekhar Sripada & Jason Stanley - 2012 - Episteme 9 (1):3-26.
Non-Traditional Factors in Judgments About Knowledge.Wesley Buckwalter - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (4):278-289.
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