In Krzysztof Apt (ed.), Proceedings of the 13th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK XIII) (2011)
Within the context of extensive-form (or dynamic) games, we use choice frames to represent the initial beliefs of a player as well as her disposition to change those beliefs when she learns that an information set of hers has been reached. As shown in , in order for the revision operation to be consistent with the AGM postulates , the player’s choice frame must be rationalizable in terms of a total pre-order on the set of histories. We consider four properties of choice frames and show that, together with the hypothesis of a common prior, are necessary and sufficient for the existence of a plausibility order that rationalizes the epistemic state (that is, initial beliefs and disposition to revise those beliefs) of all the players. The plausibility order satisfies the properties introduced in  as part of a new definition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium for dynamic games. Thus the present paper provides epistemic foundations for that solution concept
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Rational Choice and Agm Belief Revision.Giacomo Bonanno - 2009 - Artificial Intelligence 173:1194-1203.
Belief Change in Branching Time: AGM-Consistency and Iterated Revision. [REVIEW]Giacomo Bonanno - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):201-236.
Resource-Bounded Belief Revision and Contraction.Mark Jago - 2006 - In P. Torroni, U. Endriss, M. Baldoni & A. Omicini (eds.), Declarative Agent Languages and Technologies III. Springer. pp. 141--154.
Belief Revision in Games of Perfect Information.Thorsten Clausing - 2004 - Economics and Philosophy 20 (1):89-115.
Coherence, Justification, and the AGM Theory of Belief Revision.Michael J. Shaffer - 2002 - In Yves Bouchard (ed.), Perspectives on Coherentism. Editions du Scribe. pp. 139--160.
On the Logic of Iterated Belief Revision.Adnan Darwiche & Judea Pearl - 1997 - Artificial Intelligence 89:1-29.
Belief Revision in a Temporal Framework.Giacomo Bonanno - 2008 - In Krzysztof Apt & Robert van Rooij (eds.), New Perspectives on Games and Interaction. Amsterdam University Press.
Infinitary Belief Revision.Dongmo Zhang & Norman Foo - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (6):525-570.
Preference-Based Belief Revision for Rule-Based Agents.Natasha Alechina, Mark Jago & Brian Logan - 2008 - Synthese 165 (2):159-177.
Dynamic Logic for Belief Revision.Johan van Benthem - 2007 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 17 (2):129-155.
Keep 'Hoping' for Rationality: A Solution to the Backward Induction Paradox.Alexandru Baltag, Sonja Smets & Jonathan Alexander Zvesper - 2009 - Synthese 169 (2):301 - 333.
Axiomatic Characterization of the AGM Theory of Belief Revision in a Temporal Logic.Giacomo Bonanno - 2007 - Artificial Intelligence 171 (2-3):144-160.
Added to index2011-08-12
Total downloads22 ( #223,196 of 2,154,149 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #279,759 of 2,154,149 )
How can I increase my downloads?