Equilibria in social belief removal

Synthese 177 (1):97 - 123 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX


In studies of multi-agent interaction, especially in game theory, the notion of equilibrium often plays a prominent role. A typical scenario for the belief merging problem is one in which several agents pool their beliefs together to form a consistent "group" picture of the world. The aim of this paper is to define and study new notions of equilibria in belief merging. To do so, we assume the agents arrive at consistency via the use of a social belief removal function, in which each agent, using his own individual removal function, removes some belief from his stock of beliefs. We examine several notions of equilibria in this setting, assuming a general framework for individual belief removal due to Booth et al. We look at their inter-relations as well as prove their existence or otherwise. We also show how our equilibria can be seen as a generalisation of the idea of taking maximal consistent subsets of agents



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,069

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Logic Based Merging.Sébastien Konieczny & Ramón Pino Pérez - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):239-270.


Added to PP

102 (#175,377)

6 months
21 (#133,324)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Richard Booth
Cardiff University

Citations of this work

AGM 25 Years: Twenty-Five Years of Research in Belief Change.Eduardo Fermé & Sven Ove Hansson - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):295 - 331.

Add more citations