Results for 'Belief revision'

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  1. Belief Revision Generalized: A Joint Characterization of Bayes's and Jeffrey's Rules.Franz Dietrich, Christian List & Richard Bradley - 2016 - Journal of Economic Theory 162:352-371.
    We present a general framework for representing belief-revision rules and use it to characterize Bayes's rule as a classical example and Jeffrey's rule as a non-classical one. In Jeffrey's rule, the input to a belief revision is not simply the information that some event has occurred, as in Bayes's rule, but a new assignment of probabilities to some events. Despite their differences, Bayes's and Jeffrey's rules can be characterized in terms of the same axioms: "responsiveness", which (...)
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  2. Belief Revision.Hans Rott - 1995 - In Jonathan Eric Adler & Lance J. Rips (eds.), Reasoning: Studies of Human Inference and its Foundations. Cambridge University Press. pp. 514--534.
    This is a survey paper. Contents: 1 Introduction -- 2 The representation of belief -- 3 Kinds of belief change -- 4 Coherence constraints for belief revision -- 5 Different modes of belief change -- 6 Two strategies for characterizing rational changes of belief - 6.1 The postulates strategy - 6.2 The constructive strategy -- 7 An abstract view of the elements of belief change -- 8 Iterated changes of belief -- 9 (...)
     
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  3. Belief Revision II: Ranking Theory.Franz Huber - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):613-621.
    Belief revision theory studies how an ideal doxastic agent should revise her beliefs when she receives new information. In part I, I have first presented the AGM theory of belief revision. Then I have focused on the problem of iterated belief revisions. In part II, I will first present ranking theory (Spohn 1988). Then I will show how it solves the problem of iterated belief revisions. I will conclude by sketching two areas of future (...)
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  4. Belief Revisions and the Ramsey Test for Conditionals.Peter Gardenfors - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (1):81-93.
  5. Belief Revision for Growing Awareness.Katie Steele & H. Orri Stefánsson - forthcoming - Mind.
    The Bayesian maxim for rational learning could be described as conservative change from one probabilistic belief or credence function to another in response to newinformation. Roughly: ‘Hold fixed any credences that are not directly affected by the learning experience.’ This is precisely articulated for the case when we learn that some proposition that we had previously entertained is indeed true (the rule of conditionalisation). But can this conservative-change maxim be extended to revising one’s credences in response to entertaining propositions (...)
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  6. Dynamic Hyperintensional Belief Revision.Aybüke Özgün & Francesco Berto - 2021 - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-46.
    We propose a dynamic hyperintensional logic of belief revision for non-omniscient agents, reducing the logical omniscience phenomena affecting standard doxastic/epistemic logic as well as AGM belief revision theory. Our agents don’t know all a priori truths; their belief states are not closed under classical logical consequence; and their belief update policies are such that logically or necessarily equivalent contents can lead to different revisions. We model both plain and conditional belief, then focus on (...)
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  7.  66
    Infinitary Belief Revision.Dongmo Zhang & Norman Foo - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (6):525-570.
    This paper extends the AGM theory of belief revision to accommodate infinitary belief change. We generalize both axiomatization and modeling of the AGM theory. We show that most properties of the AGM belief change operations are preserved by the generalized operations whereas the infinitary belief change operations have their special properties. We prove that the extended axiomatic system for the generalized belief change operators with a Limit Postulate properly specifies infinite belief change. This (...)
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  8.  67
    Belief Revision: A Critique. [REVIEW]Nir Friedman & Joseph Y. Halpern - 1999 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 8 (4):401-420.
    We examine carefully the rationale underlying the approaches to belief change taken in the literature, and highlight what we view as methodological problems. We argue that to study belief change carefully, we must be quite explicit about the ontology or scenario underlying the belief change process. This is something that has been missing in previous work, with its focus on postulates. Our analysis shows that we must pay particular attention to two issues that have often been taken (...)
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  9. Belief Revision I: The AGM Theory.Franz Huber - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):604-612.
    Belief revision theory studies how an ideal doxastic agent should revise her beliefs when she receives new information. In part I I will first present the AGM theory of belief revision (Alchourrón & Gärdenfors & Makinson 1985). Then I will focus on the problem of iterated belief revisions.
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  10. Interrogative Belief Revision in Modal Logic.Sebastian Enqvist - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (5):527-548.
    The well known AGM framework for belief revision has recently been extended to include a model of the research agenda of the agent, i.e. a set of questions to which the agent wishes to find answers (Olsson & Westlund in Erkenntnis , 65 , 165–183, 2006 ). The resulting model has later come to be called interrogative belief revision . While belief revision has been studied extensively from the point of view of modal logic, (...)
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  11. Iterated Belief Revision.Robert Stalnaker - 2009 - Erkenntnis 70 (2):189-209.
    This is a discussion of the problem of extending the basic AGM belief revision theory to iterated belief revision: the problem of formulating rules, not only for revising a basic belief state in response to potential new information, but also for revising one’s revision rules in response to potential new information. The emphasis in the paper is on foundational questions about the nature of and motivation for various constraints, and about the methodology of the (...)
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  12.  37
    Irrevocable Belief Revision in Dynamic Doxastic Logic.Krister Segerberg - 1998 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 39 (3):287-306.
    In this paper we present a new modeling for belief revision that is what we term irrevocable. This modeling is of philosophical interest since it captures some features of suppositional reasoning, and of formal interest since it is closely connected with AGM, yet provides for iterated belief revision. The analysis is couched in terms of dynamic doxastic logic.
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  13. Simple Hyperintensional Belief Revision.F. Berto - 2018 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):559-575.
    I present a possible worlds semantics for a hyperintensional belief revision operator, which reduces the logical idealization of cognitive agents affecting similar operators in doxastic and epistemic logics, as well as in standard AGM belief revision theory. belief states are not closed under classical logical consequence; revising by inconsistent information does not perforce lead to trivialization; and revision can be subject to ‘framing effects’: logically or necessarily equivalent contents can lead to different revisions. Such (...)
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  14. The Limits of Rational Belief Revision: A Dilemma for the Darwinian Debunker.Katia Vavova - forthcoming - Noûs.
    We are fallible creatures, prone to making all sorts of mistakes. So, we should be open to evidence of error. But what constitutes such evidence? And what is it to rationally accommodate it? I approach these questions by considering an evolutionary debunking argument according to which (a) we have good, scientific, reason to think our moral beliefs are mistaken, and (b) rationally accommodating this requires revising our confidence in, or altogether abandoning the suspect beliefs. I present a dilemma for such (...)
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  15. Dynamic Logic for Belief Revision.Johan van Benthem - 2007 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 17 (2):129-155.
    We show how belief revision can be treated systematically in the format of dynamicepistemic logic, when operators of conditional belief are added. The core engine consists of definable update rules for changing plausibility relations between worlds, which have been proposed independently in the dynamic-epistemic literature on preference change. Our analysis yields two new types of modal result. First, we obtain complete logics for concrete mechanisms of belief revision, based on compositional reduction axioms. Next, we show (...)
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  16.  90
    Belief Revision in Games: Forward and Backward Induction.Robert Stalnaker - 1998 - Mathematical Social Sciences 36 (1):31 - 56.
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  17. Iterated Belief Revision, Reliability, and Inductive Amnesia.Kevin T. Kelly - 1999 - Erkenntnis 50 (1):11-58.
    Belief revision theory concerns methods for reformulating an agent's epistemic state when the agent's beliefs are refuted by new information. The usual guiding principle in the design of such methods is to preserve as much of the agent's epistemic state as possible when the state is revised. Learning theoretic research focuses, instead, on a learning method's reliability or ability to converge to true, informative beliefs over a wide range of possible environments. This paper bridges the two perspectives by (...)
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  18. Belief Revision Theory.Hanti Lin - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 349-396.
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  19. Belief Revision, Epistemic Conditionals and the Ramsey Test.Sten Lindström & Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz - 1992 - Synthese 91 (3):195-237.
    Epistemic conditionals have often been thought to satisfy the Ramsey test : If A, then B is acceptable in a belief state G if and only if B should be accepted upon revising G with A. But as Peter Gärdenfors has shown, RT conflicts with the intuitively plausible condition of Preservation on belief revision. We investigate what happens if RT is retained while Preservation is weakened, or vice versa. We also generalize Gärdenfors' approach by treating belief (...)
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  20. Paraconsistent Belief Revision Based on a Formal Consistency Operator.Rafael R. Testa, Marcelo E. Coniglio & Márcio M. Ribeiro - 2015 - CLE E-Prints 15 (8):01-11.
    In this paper two systems of AGM-like Paraconsistent Belief Revision are overviewed, both defined over Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs) due to the possibility of defining a formal consistency operator within these logics. The AGM° system is strongly based on this operator and internalize the notion of formal consistency in the explicit constructions and postulates. Alternatively, the AGMp system uses the AGM-compliance of LFIs and thus assumes a wider notion of paraconsistency - not necessarily related to the notion (...)
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  21. Two Approaches to Belief Revision.Ted Shear & Branden Fitelson - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):487-518.
    In this paper, we compare and contrast two methods for the revision of qualitative beliefs. The first method is generated by a simplistic diachronic Lockean thesis requiring coherence with the agent’s posterior credences after conditionalization. The second method is the orthodox AGM approach to belief revision. Our primary aim is to determine when the two methods may disagree in their recommendations and when they must agree. We establish a number of novel results about their relative behavior. Our (...)
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  22.  53
    Belief Revision From the Point of View of Doxastic Logic.Krister Segerberg - 1995 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 3 (4):535-553.
    In 1985 Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson presented their now classic theory of theory change . In 1988 Adam Grove, generalizing David Lewis's theory of counterfactuals, presented a model theory suitable for the AGM theory. Although AGM and Grove mentioned object languages, neither used them. But recently, Maarten de Rijke has shown how object languages can be brought into the picture. In the present paper we take de Rijke's idea further, addressing the question whether there is a particular doxastic or epistemic (...)
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  23. Belief Revision and Epistemology.John Pollock & Anthony Gillies - 2000 - Synthese 122 (1-2):69-92.
    Postulational approaches attempt to understand the dynamics of belief revision by appealing to no more than the set of beliefs held by an agent and the logical relations between them. It is argued there that such an approach cannot work. A proper account of belief revision must also appeal to the arguments supporting beliefs, and recognize that those arguments can be defeasible. If we begin with a mature epistemological theory that accommodates this, it can be seen (...)
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  24. Two Dogmas of Belief Revision.Hans Rott - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (9):503-522.
    The paper attacks the almost universally held view that belief revison theories, as they have been studied in the literature of the past two decades, are founded on a Principle of Minimal Change, or Principle of Informational Economy. The principle comes in two versions. According to the first, an agent should, when accepting new information, aim at a posterior belief set that minimizes the items on which it disagrees with the prior belief set. If there are different (...)
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  25.  52
    Belief Revision in Non-Classical Logics.Dov Gabbay, Odinaldo Rodrigues & Alessandra Russo - 2008 - Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (3):267-304.
    In this article, we propose a belief revision approach for families of (non-classical) logics whose semantics are first-order axiomatisable. Given any such (non-classical) logic , the approach enables the definition of belief revision operators for , in terms of a belief revision operation satisfying the postulates for revision theory proposed by Alchourrrdenfors and Makinson (AGM revision, Alchourrukasiewicz's many-valued logic. In addition, we present a general methodology to translate algebraic logics into classical logic. (...)
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  26. Probabilistic Dynamic Belief Revision.Alexandru Baltag & Sonja Smets - 2008 - Synthese 165 (2):179 - 202.
    We investigate the discrete (finite) case of the Popper–Renyi theory of conditional probability, introducing discrete conditional probabilistic models for knowledge and conditional belief, and comparing them with the more standard plausibility models. We also consider a related notion, that of safe belief, which is a weak (non-negatively introspective) type of “knowledge”. We develop a probabilistic version of this concept (“degree of safety”) and we analyze its role in games. We completely axiomatize the logic of conditional belief, knowledge (...)
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  27. Paraconsistent Belief Revision.Graham Priest - 2001 - Theoria 67 (3):214-228.
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  28.  26
    Reliable Belief Revision.Kevin T. Kelly, Oliver Schulte & Vincent Hendricks - unknown
    Philosophical logicians proposing theories of rational belief revision have had little to say about whether their proposals assist or impede the agent's ability to reliably arrive at the truth as his beliefs change through time. On the other hand, reliability is the central concern of formal learning theory. In this paper we investigate the belief revision theory of Alchourron, Gardenfors and Makinson from a learning theoretic point of view.
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  29. Belief Revision and Uncertain Reasoning.Guy Politzer & Laure Carles - 2001 - Thinking and Reasoning 7 (3):217 – 234.
    When a new piece of information contradicts a currently held belief, one has to modify the set of beliefs in order to restore its consistency. In the case where it is necessary to give up a belief, some of them are less likely to be abandoned than others. The concept of epistemic entrenchment is used by some AI approaches to explain this fact based on formal properties of the belief set (e.g., transitivity). Two experiments were designed to (...)
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  30. Belief Revision and Verisimilitude.Mark Ryan & Pierre-Yves Schobbens - 1995 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 36 (1):15-29.
    The Egli-Milner power-ordering is used to define verisimilitude orderings on theories from preference orderings on models. The effects of the definitions on constraints such as stopperedness and soundness are explored. Orderings on theories are seen to contain more information than orderings on models. Belief revision is defined in terms of both types of orderings, and conditions are given which make the two notions coincide.
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  31.  87
    Belief Revision Conditionals: Basic Iterated Systems.Horacio Arló-Costa - 1999 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 96 (1-3):3-28.
    It is now well known that, on pain of triviality, the probability of a conditional cannot be identified with the corresponding conditional probability [25]. This surprising impossibility result has a qualitative counterpart. In fact, Peter Gärdenfors showed in [13] that believing ‘If A then B’ cannot be equated with the act of believing B on the supposition that A — as long as supposing obeys minimal Bayesian constraints. Recent work has shown that in spite of these negative results, the question (...)
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  32. Belief Revision in a Temporal Framework.Giacomo Bonanno - 2008 - In Krzysztof Apt & Robert van Rooij (eds.), New Perspectives on Games and Interaction. Amsterdam University Press.
    The theory of belief revision deals with (rational) changes in beliefs in response to new information. In the literature a distinction has been drawn between belief revision and belief update (see [6]). The former deals with situations where the objective facts describing the world do not change (so that only the beliefs of the agent change over time), while the letter allows for situations where both the facts and the doxastic state of the agent change (...)
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  33.  22
    Two Dogmas of Belief Revision.Hans Rott - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (9):503.
    The paper attacks the widely held view that belief revision theories, as they have been studied in the past two decades, are founded on the Principle of Informational Economy. The principle comes in two versions. According to the first, an agent should, when accepting a new piece of information, aim at a minimal change of his previously held beliefs. If there are different ways to effect the belief change, then the agent should, according to he second version, (...)
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  34. Belief Revision and Verisimilitude Based on Preference and Truth Orderings.Gerard Renardel de Lavalette & Sjoerd Zwart - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (2):237-254.
    In this rather technical paper we establish a useful combination of belief revision and verisimilitude according to which better theories provide better predictions, and revising with more verisimilar data results in theories that are closer to the truth. Moreover, this paper presents two alternative definitions of refined verisimilitude, which are more perspicuous than the algebraic version used in previous publications.
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  35.  1
    Dynamic Belief Revision Operators.Abhaya C. Nayak, Maurice Pagnucco & Pavlos Peppas - 2003 - Artificial Intelligence 146 (2):193-228.
  36. Ten Philosophical Problems in Belief Revision.Sven Ove Hansson - 2003
    The paper introduces ten open problems in belief revision theory, related to the representation of the belief state, to different notions of degrees of belief, and to the nature of change operations. It is argued that these problems are all issues in philosopical logic, in the strong sense of requiring inputs from both logic and philosophy for their solution.
     
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  37.  13
    Belief Revision in a Framework for Default Reasoning.Gerhard Brewka - 1991 - In André Fuhrmann & Michael Morreau (eds.), The Logic of Theory Change. Springer. pp. 206--222.
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  38.  31
    Belief Revision, Conditional Logic and Nonmonotonic Reasoning.Wayne Wobcke - 1995 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 36 (1):55-103.
    We consider the connections between belief revision, conditional logic and nonmonotonic reasoning, using as a foundation the approach to theory change developed by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson (the AGM approach). This is first generalized to allow the iteration of theory change operations to capture the dynamics of epistemic states according to a principle of minimal change of entrenchment. The iterative operations of expansion, contraction and revision are characterized both by a set of postulates and by Grove's construction (...)
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  39.  49
    AGM Belief Revision in Monotone Modal Logics.Gregory Wheeler - 2010 - LPAR 2010 Short Paper Proceedings.
    Classical modal logics, based on the neighborhood semantics of Scott and Montague, provide a generalization of the familiar normal systems based on Kripke semantics. This paper defines AGM revision operators on several first-order monotonic modal correspondents, where each first-order correspondence language is defined by Marc Pauly’s version of the van Benthem characterization theorem for monotone modal logic. A revision problem expressed in a monotone modal system is translated into first-order logic, the revision is performed, and the new (...)
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  40.  28
    Belief Revision, Probabilism, and Logic Choice.Edwin Mares - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (4):647-670.
  41.  56
    Belief Revision and Verisimilitude Based on Preference and Truth Orderings.Gerard R. Renardel de Lavalette & Sjoerd D. Zwart - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (2):237-254.
    In this rather technical paper we establish a useful combination of belief revision and verisimilitude according to which better theories provide better predictions, and revising with more verisimilar data results in theories that are closer to the truth. Moreover, this paper presents two alternative definitions of refined verisimilitude, which are more perspicuous than the algebraic version used in previous publications.
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  42.  8
    Approximate Belief Revision.S. Chopra, R. Parikh & R. Wassermann - 2001 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 9 (6):755-768.
    The standard theory for belief revision provides an elegant and powerful framework for reasoning about how a rational agent should change its beliefs when confronted with new information. However, the agents considered are extremely idealized. Some recent models attempt to tackle the problem of plausible belief revision by adding structure to the belief bases and using nonstandard inference operations. One of the key ideas is that not all of an agent's beliefs are relevant for an (...)
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  43. Truth in Fiction, Impossible Worlds, and Belief Revision.Francesco Berto & Christopher Badura - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):178-193.
    We present a theory of truth in fiction that improves on Lewis's [1978] ‘Analysis 2’ in two ways. First, we expand Lewis's possible worlds apparatus by adding non-normal or impossible worlds. Second, we model truth in fiction as belief revision via ideas from dynamic epistemic logic. We explain the major objections raised against Lewis's original view and show that our theory overcomes them.
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  44.  63
    A Structuralist Theory of Belief Revision.Holger Andreas - 2011 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 20 (2):205-232.
    The present paper aims at a synthesis of belief revision theory with the Sneed formalism known as the structuralist theory of science. This synthesis is brought about by a dynamisation of classical structuralism, with an abductive inference rule and base generated revisions in the style of Rott (2001). The formalism of prioritised default logic (PDL) serves as the medium of the synthesis. Why seek to integrate the Sneed formalism into belief revision theory? With the hybrid system (...)
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  45.  3
    Interrogative Belief Revision.Sebastian Enqvist - 2011 - Dissertation, Lund University
    This thesis deals with the theory of interrogative belief revision, a recent development in the subfield of philosophical logic known as belief revision theory. While classical belief revision theory deals with the dynamics of an agent’s beliefs, interrogative belief revision aims to describe the dynamics of the agent’s questions about the world, or research agenda, as well. Great emphasis is put on the interaction between belief change and changes in the research (...)
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  46.  50
    Distance Semantics for Belief Revision.Daniel Lehmann, Menachem Magidor & Karl Schlechta - 2001 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 66 (1):295-317.
    A vast and interesting family of natural semantics for belief revision is defined. Suppose one is given a distance d between any two models. One may then define the revision of a theory K by a formula α as the theory defined by the set of all those models of α that are closest, by d, to the set of models of K. This family is characterized by a set of rationality postulates that extends the AGM postulates. (...)
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  47.  35
    Belief Revision, Rational Choice and the Unity of Reason.Erik J. Olsson - 2003 - Studia Logica 73 (2):219 - 240.
    Hans Rott has argued, most recently in his book Change, Choice and Inference, that certain formal correspondences between belief revision and rational choice have important philosophical implications, claiming that the former strongly indicate the unity of practical and theoretical reason as well as the primacy of practical reason. In this paper, I confront Rott's argument with three serious challenges. My conclusion is that, while Rott's work is indisputable as a formal achievement, the philosophical consequences he wants to draw (...)
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  48.  90
    Verisimilitude and Belief Revision. With a Focus on the Relevant Element Account.Gerhard Schurz - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (2):203-221.
    The expansion or revision of false theories by true evidence does not always increase their verisimilitude. After a comparison of different notions of verisimilitude the relation between verisimilitude and belief expansion or revision is investigated within the framework of the relevant element account. We are able to find certain interesting conditions under which both the expansion and the revision of theories by true evidence is guaranteed to increase their verisimilitude.
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  49. Moorean Facts and Belief Revision, or Can the Skeptic Win?Thomas Kelly - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):179-209.
    A Moorean fact, in the words of the late David Lewis, is ‘one of those things that we know better than we know the premises of any philosophical argument to the contrary’. Lewis opens his seminal paper ‘Elusive Knowledge’ with the following declaration.
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  50. Belief Revision and Truthlikeness.I. Niiniluoto - 1999 - In B. Hansson, S. Halld’en, N.-E. Sahlin & W. Rabinowicz (eds.), Internet Festschrift for Peter Gärdenfors. Department of Philosophy, Lund University.
     
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