Metaphysical realism as a pre-condition of visual perception

Biology and Philosophy 19 (2):243-261 (2004)

Stephen Boulter
Oxford Brookes University
In this paper I present a transcendental argument based on the findings of cognitive psychology and neurophysiology which invites two conclusions: First and foremost, that a pre-condition of visual perception itself is precisely what the Aristotelian and other commonsense realists maintain, namely, the independent existence of a featured, or pre-packaged world; second, this finding, combined with other reflections, suggests that, contra McDowell and other neo-Kantians, human beings have access to things as they are in the world via non-projective perception. These two conclusions taken together form the basis of Aristotelian metaphysical realism and a refutation of the neo-Kantian two-factor approach to perception
Keywords Biology  Perception  Realism  Science  Vision
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1023/B:BIPH.0000024405.82013.34
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 47,283
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Objects Limit Human Comprehension.Philip Richard Sullivan - 2009 - Biology and Philosophy 24 (1):65-79.
Education From a Biological Point of View.Stephen Boulter - 2017 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 36 (2):167-182.
Preconceptual Intelligibility in Perception.Daniel Dwyer - 2013 - Continental Philosophy Review 46 (4):533-553.
Kitcher’s Modest Realism: The Reconceptualization of Scientific Objectivity.Antonio Dieguez - 2010 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 101 (1):141-169.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
263 ( #26,500 of 2,290,695 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #403,467 of 2,290,695 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes

Sign in to use this feature