Naive and Direct Realism

Edited by Benj Hellie (University of Toronto, University of Toronto at Scarborough)
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  1. Berkeley and Epistemology.Robert Merrihew Adams - 1987 - In Ernest Sosa (ed.), Essays on the Philosophy of George Berkeley. D. Reidel.
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  2. Naive Realism And Naive Antirealism.Evandro Agazzi - 1989 - Dialectica 43 (1‐2):83-98.
    SummaryScientific realism is here made equivalent to the referentiality of scientific language. A clear distinction of meaning and reference is advocated and certain ‘symptoms' of referentiality in scientific language are stressed. It is then shown that contemporary scholars stressing the contextual determination of meaning, the meaning variance and theory‐ladenness of all terms in scientific theories, often fail to recognize that an independent ‘stable’ core of the meaning still exists. This allows for theory comparison and is witness that science investigates reality, (...)
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  3. On the Explanatory Power of Hallucination.Dominic Alford-Duguid & Michael Arsenault - forthcoming - Synthese:1-21.
    Pautz has argued that the most prominent naive realist account of hallucination—negative epistemic disjunctivism—cannot explain how hallucinations enable us to form beliefs about perceptually presented properties. He takes this as grounds to reject both negative epistemic disjunctivism and naive realism. Our aims are two: First, to show that this objection is dialectically ineffective against naive realism, and second, to draw morals from the failure of this objection for the dispute over the nature of perceptual experience at large.
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  4. A Naive Realist Theory of Colour.Keith Allen - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
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  5. Content, Object, and Phenomenal Character.Marco Aurelio Sousa Alves - 2012 - Principia, an International Journal of Epistemology 16 (3):417-449.
    The view that perceptual experience has representational content, or the content view, has recently been criticized by the defenders of the so-called object view. Part of the dispute, I claim here, is based on a lack of grasp of the notion of content. There is, however, a core of substantial disagreement. Once the substantial core is revealed, I aim to: (1) reject the arguments raised against the content view by Campbell (2002), Travis (2004), and Brewer (2006); (2) criticize Brewer’s (2006, (...)
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  6. Simple and Sophisticated “Naive” Semantics.Peter Alward - 2000 - Dialogue 39 (01):101-.
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  7. The Argument From Slips.Santiago Amaya - 2015 - In Andrei Buckareff, Carlos Moya & Sergi Rosell (eds.), Agency, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility. pp. 13-29.
    Philosophers of perception are familiar with the argument from illusion, at least since Hume formulated it to challenge a naïve form of realism. In this paper, I present an analogous argument but in the domain of action. It focuses on slips, a common kind of mistake. But, otherwise, it is structurally similar. The argument challenges some contemporary views about the nature of action inspired by Wittgenstein. The discussion shows how thinking about these common mistakes helps illuminate aspects of human agency (...)
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  8. Naïve Realism and Unconscious Perception: A Reply to Berger and Nanay.Alfonso Anaya & Sam Clarke - forthcoming - Analysis.
    In a recent paper, Berger and Nanay consider, and reject, three ways of addressing the phenomenon of unconscious perception within a naive realist framework. Since these three approaches seem to exhaust the options open to naive realists, and since there is said to be excellent evidence that perception of the same fundamental kind can occur, both consciously and unconsciously, this is seen to present a problem for the view. We take this opportunity to show that all three approaches considered remain (...)
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  9. Naive and Critical Falsificationism.Gunnar Andersson - 1982 - In Karl R. Popper & Paul Levinson (eds.), In Pursuit of Truth: Essays on the Philosophy of Karl Popper on the Occasion of His 80th Birthday. Harvester Press. pp. 50--63.
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  10. Dealing with Naive Relativism in the Philosophy Classroom.Judith Andre - 1983 - Metaphilosophy 14 (2):179–182.
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  11. The Openness of Illusions.Louise Antony - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):25-44.
    Illusions are thought to make trouble for the intuition that perceptual experience is "open" to the world. Some have suggested, in response to the this trouble, that illusions differ from veridical experience in the degree to which their character is determined by their engagement with the world. An understanding of the psychology of perception reveals that this is not the case: veridical and falsidical perceptions engage the world in the same way and to the same extent. While some contemporary vision (...)
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  12. The Circle of Acquaintance: Perception, Consciousness, and Empathy, by David Woodruff Smith.Richard E. Aquila - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):994-997.
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  13. Rejoinder to Michael Huemer's "How to Be a Perceptual Realist" (Fall 2005): Direct Realism and Causation.Ari Armstrong - 2005 - Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 7 (1):239 - 245.
    Armstrong disagrees with Huemer over the proper interpretation of the Objectivist theory of concepts. Huemer worries that Objectivists empty perception of content, while Armstrong argues mat Objectivists recognize some content. However, Huemer attempts to inject conceptual content into perception, which explains why his treatment of illusions differs from that of Objectivists.
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  14. Direct Realism and Causation.Ari Armstrong - 2005 - Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 7 (1).
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  15. A Direct Realist's Challenge to Skepticism. [REVIEW]Ari Armstrong - 2004 - Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 5 (2):421 - 440.
    Armstrong reviews Michael Huemer's Skepticism and the Veil of Perception and finds in it strong support for the perceptual theory of direct realism. However, Huemer incorrectly assumes perceptual experiences can contain conceptual—and thus causal —information. Regardless, Huemer's theory of "phenomenal conservatism" serves to justify our perceptual judgments and refute skepticism in a way compatible with the preliminary work of Objectivist philosophers, such as David Kelley and Leonard Peikoff.
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  16. Mr Arthadeva and Naive Realism.David M. Armstrong - 1959 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 37 (May):67-70.
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  17. Illusions of Sense.David M. Armstrong - 1955 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 33 (August):88-106.
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  18. Naive Realism and the Problem of Color-Seeing in Dim Light.B. M. Arthadeva - 1961 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 21 (June):467-478.
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  19. Naive Realism and Illusions: The Elliptical Penny.B. M. Arthadeva - 1959 - Philosophy 34 (October):323-330.
    How can naïve realism defend itself in face of the illusion of the penny which looks elliptical when it is seen obliquely? Of late many philosophers have tried to deny that a penny looks elliptical when viewed obliquely: they have claimed that it still looks round. It may be true to say this of a small object like a penny, but it cannot be denied that the surfaces of objects in general do look different in shape when viewed from different (...)
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  20. Naive Realism and Illusions of Refraction.B. M. Arthadeva - 1959 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 37 (August):118-137.
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  21. Naïve Realism and Illusions of Refraction.M. Arthadeva - 1959 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):118-137.
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  22. Naive Realism and Illusions of Reflection.M. Arthadeva - 1957 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 35 (3):155 – 169.
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  23. Perception and Identity: Essays Presented to A. J. Ayer, with His Replies.A. J. Ayer & Graham Macdonald (eds.) - 1979 - Cornell University Press.
  24. Williams James' Direct Realism: A Reconstruction.Erik C. Banks - 2013 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 30 (3):271-291.
    William James' Radical Empiricist essays offer a unique and powerful argument for direct realism about our perceptions of objects. This theory can be completed with some observations by Kant on the intellectual preconditions for a perceptual judgment. Finally James and Kant deliver a powerful blow to the representational theory of perception and knowledge, which applies quite broadly to theories of representation generally.
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  25. On Intellectual Conversion.Garrett Barden - 2003 - Journal of Macrodynamic Analysis 3:117-141.
    This essay focusses on two questions: What is intellectual conversion? Why is naive realism attractive?
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  26. Perceptual Justification and the Cartesian Theater.David James Barnett - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.
    According to a traditional Cartesian epistemology of perception, perception does not provide one with direct knowledge of the external world. Instead, when you look out to see a red wall, what you learn first is not a fact about the color of the wall—i.e., that it is red—but instead a fact about your own visual experience—i.e., that the wall looks red to you. If you are to justifiably believe that the wall is red, you must be in a position to (...)
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  27. Seeing is Believing? How Reinterpreting Perception as Dynamic Engagement Alters the Justificatory Force of Religious Experience.Nathaniel F. Barrett & Wesley J. Wildman - 2009 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 66 (2):71 - 86.
    William Alston’s Theory of Appearing has attracted considerable attention in recent years, both for its elegant interpretation of direct realism in light of the presentational character of perceptual experience and for its central role in his defense of the justificatory force of Christian mystical experiences. There are different ways to account for presentational character, however, and in this article we argue that a superior interpretation of direct realism can be given by a theory of perception as dynamic engagement. The conditions (...)
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  28. Lockes „Idea” En Yoltons „Claim” : Een Bijdrage Tot de Discussie Over Representationalisme En Direct Realisme in de Cognitieve Psychologie.Anti Bax & René Jorna - 1986 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 48 (3):479 - 493.
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  29. Internalism Empowered: How to Bolster a Theory of Justification with a Direct Realist Theory of Awareness.Benjamin Bayer - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (4):383-408.
    Abstract The debate in the philosophy of perception between direct realists and representationalists should influence the debate in epistemology between internalists and externalists about justification. If direct realists are correct, there are more consciously accessible justifiers for internalists to exploit than externalists think. Internalists can retain their distinctive internalist identity while accepting this widened conception of internalistic justification: even if they welcome the possibility of cognitive access to external facts, their position is still quite distinct from the typical externalist position. (...)
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  30. A Role for Abstractionism in a Direct Realist Foundationalism.Benjamin Bayer - 2011 - Synthese 180 (3):357-389.
    Both traditional and naturalistic epistemologists have long assumed that the examination of human psychology has no relevance to the prescriptive goal of traditional epistemology, that of providing first-person guidance in determining the truth. Contrary to both, I apply insights about the psychology of human perception and concept-formation to a very traditional epistemological project: the foundationalist approach to the epistemic regress problem. I argue that direct realism about perception can help solve the regress problem and support a foundationalist account of justification, (...)
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  31. Sensorimotor Direct Realism: How We Enact Our World.M. Beaton - 2016 - Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):265-276.
    Context: Direct realism is a non-reductive, anti-representationalist theory of perception lying at the heart of mainstream analytic philosophy, where it is currently generating a lot of interest. For all that, it is widely held to be both controversial and anti-scientific. On the other hand, the sensorimotor theory of perception initially generated a lot of interest within enactive philosophy of cognitive science, but has arguably not yet delivered on its initial promise. Problem: I aim to show that the sensorimotor theory and (...)
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  32. Author’s Response: The Personal Level in Sensorimotor Theory.M. Beaton - 2016 - Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):289-297.
    Upshot: I offer responses to the commentaries on my target article in five short sections. The first section, about the plurality of lived worlds, concerns issues of quite general interest to readers of this journal. The second section presents some reasons for rejecting “enabling” as well as “constitutive” representational approaches to understanding the mind. In the remaining three sections, I clarify aspects of sensorimotor direct realism relating to the self, qualia, counterfactuals, and the notion of “mastery.”.
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  33. Phenomenology and Embodied Action.M. Beaton - 2013 - Constructivist Foundations 8 (3):298-313.
    Context: The enactivist tradition, out of which neurophenomenology arose, rejects various internalisms – including the representationalist and information-processing metaphors – but remains wedded to one further internalism: the claim that the structure of perceptual experience is directly, constitutively linked only to internal, brain-based dynamics. Problem: I aim to reject this internalism and defend an alternative analysis. Method: The paper presents a direct-realist, externalist, sensorimotor account of perceptual experience. It uses the concept of counterfactual meaningful action to defend this view against (...)
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  34. Criticism and Realism.Jon Beckwith - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (1):72.
  35. Relationalism and Unconscious Perception.Jacob Berger & Bence Nanay - 2016 - Analysis 76 (4):426-433.
    Relationalism holds that perceptual experiences are relations between subjects and perceived objects. But much evidence suggests that perceptual states can be unconscious. We argue here that unconscious perception raises difficulties for relationalism. Relationalists would seem to have three options. First, they may deny that there is unconscious perception or question whether we have sufficient evidence to posit it. Second, they may allow for unconscious perception but deny that the relationalist analysis applies to it. Third, they may offer a relationalist explanation (...)
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  36. John McDowell, Mind and World.Monika Betzler - 1998 - Erkenntnis 48 (1):117-122.
  37. Grounding Naïve Physics and Optics in Perception.Ivana Bianchi & Ugo Savardi - 2014 - Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 9 (1).
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  38. Review of John McDowell, Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge. [REVIEW]Tim Black - 2011 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  39. In Search of Direct Realism.Laurence BonJour - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):349-367.
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  40. Metaphysical Realism as a Pre-Condition of Visual Perception.Stephen J. Boulter - 2004 - Biology and Philosophy 19 (2):243-261.
    In this paper I present a transcendental argument based on the findings of cognitive psychology and neurophysiology which invites two conclusions: First and foremost, that a pre-condition of visual perception itself is precisely what the Aristotelian and other commonsense realists maintain, namely, the independent existence of a featured, or pre-packaged world; second, this finding, combined with other reflections, suggests that, contra McDowell and other neo-Kantians, human beings have access to things as they are in the world via non-projective perception. These (...)
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  41. Ayer and Russell on Naive Realism.Michael Bradie - 1976 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1976:175 - 181.
    In this article Ayer's criticisms of Russell's defense of scientific realism and his criticisms of Russell's rejection of naive realism are discussed. It is argued that Ayer's criticisms either lack force or depend for their validity on the assumption of existence of a clear cut distinction between conventional and factual issues, an assumption which is question begging with respect to his discussion of Russell.
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  42. Perception and Rational Constraint: McDowell's "Mind and World".Bob Brandom - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:241 - 259.
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  43. Non-Inferential Knowledge, Perceptual Experience, and Secondary Qualities: Placing McDowell's Empiricism.Robert B. Brandom - 2002 - In Reading McDowell: On Mind and World. New York: Routledge.
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  44. Reading McDowell: On Mind and World.Robert B. Brandom - 2002 - New York: Routledge.
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  45. Perception and Rational Constraint: McDowell's Mind and World.Robert B. Brandom - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:241-259.
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  46. Cornman, Sensa, and the Argument From Hallucination.Philip Bretzel - 1974 - Philosophical Studies 26 (5-6):443-445.
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  47. Attention and Direct Realism.Bill Brewer - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):421-435.
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  48. Realism and Explanation in Perception.Bill Brewer - 2011 - In Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. Oxford University Press.
    Suppose that wc identify physical objccts, in thc first instance, by extension, as things like stones, tables, trees, people and other animals: the persisting macroscopic constituents of the world in which we live. Of course, there is a substantive question of what it is to be y such things in the way relevant to categorization as a physical object. So this can hardly be the final word on the matter. Still, it is equally clear that this gives us all a (...)
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  49. How to Account for Illusion.Bill Brewer - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 168-180.
    The question how to account for illusion has had a prominent role in shaping theories of perception throughout the history of philosophy. Prevailing philosophical wisdom today has it that phenomena of illusion force us to choose between the following two options. First, reject altogether the early modern empiricist idea that the core subjective character of perceptual experience is to be given simply by citing the object presented in that experience. Instead we must characterize perceptual experience entirely in terms of its (...)
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  50. Perception and Content.Bill Brewer - 2006 - European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):165-181.
    It is close to current orthodoxy that perceptual experience is to be characterized, at least in part, by its representational content, roughly, by the way it represents things as being in the world around the perceiver. Call this basic idea the content view.
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