Introduction

In Thiemo Breyer & Christopher Gutland (eds.), Phenomenology of Thinking: Philosophical Investigations into the Character of Cognitive Experiences. pp. 1-24 (2015)

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Abstract
Do we experience our thoughts and thinking, or are they subpersonal factors that functionally determine our experience without themselves being experienced? And if we do experience them, do they have a certain qualitative feel to them like pain or color sensations? Within philosophy of mind, these questions are seminal and have led to an ongoing debate over ‘cognitive phenomenology.’ Although both proponents and opponents of the existence and relevance of cognitive phenomenology have presented intriguing arguments, to this day the debate does not yield a conclusive, encompassing, and convincing answer pertaining to the question of whether thinking does or can have an experiential character.
Keywords conscious thought  cognitive phenomenology  consciousness
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References found in this work BETA

On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Being and Time: A Translation of Sein Und Zeit.Martin Heidegger - 1996 - State University of New York Press.
The Case Against Cognitive Phenomenology.Peter Carruthers & Bénédicte Veillet - 2011 - In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive phenomenology. Oxford University Press. pp. 35.

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