Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):111-128 (2007)
The common image of the fully virtuous person is of someone with perfect self-command and self-perception, who always makes correct evaluations. However, modesty appears to be areal virtue, and it seems contradictory for someone to believe that she is modest. Accordingly, traditional defenders of phronesis (the view that virtue involves practical wisdom) deny that modesty is a virtue, while defenders of modesty such as Julia Driver deny that phronesis is required for virtue. I offer a new theory of modesty-the two standards account-under which phronesis and modesty are reconciled. Additionally, since the two standards account involves reflection on llloral ideals, I provide an account of the proper nature of moral ideals.
|Keywords||modesty virtues of ignorance Adam Smith Julia Driver phronesis two standards account|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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