The creationist fiction: The case against creationism about fictional characters
Philosophical Review 119 (3):337-364 (2010)
Abstract
This essay explains why creationism about fictional characters is an abject failure. Creationism about fictional characters is the view that fictional objects are created by the authors of the novels in which they first appear. This essay shows that, when the details of creationism are filled in, the hypothesis becomes far more puzzling than the linguistic data it is used to explain. No matter how the creationist identifies where, when and how fictional objects are created, the proposal conflicts with other strong intuitions we have about fictional characters.Author's Profile
DOI
10.1215/00318108-2010-003
My notes
Similar books and articles
Philosophical Perspectives on Fictional Characters.Paisley Nathan Livingston & Andrea Sauchelli - 2011 - New Literary History 42 (2):337-360.
Fictional characters and literary practices.Amie L. Thomasson - 2003 - British Journal of Aesthetics 43 (2):138-157.
Pretense, existence, and fictional objects.Anthony Everett - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):56–80.
How to be a Nominalist and a Fictional Realist.Ross P. Cameron - 2013 - In Christy Mag Uidhir (ed.), Art and Abstract Objects. Oxford University Press. pp. 179.
In defence of fictional realism.Benjamin Schnieder & Tatjana von Solodkoff - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):138-149.
The great beetle debate: A study in imagining with names.Stacie Friend - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):183-211.
A defense of creationism in fiction.Jeffrey Goodman - 2004 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 67 (1):131-155.
Analytics
Added to PP
2010-07-08
Downloads
329 (#36,057)
6 months
11 (#83,130)
2010-07-08
Downloads
329 (#36,057)
6 months
11 (#83,130)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
Abstract Creationism and Authorial Intention.David Friedell - 2016 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 74 (2):129-137.
Which witch is which? Exotic objects and intentional identity.Alexander Sandgren - 2018 - Synthese 195 (2):721-739.
On Inadvertently Made Tables: a Brockean Theory of Concrete Artifacts.Jeffrey Goodman - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (1):1-9.
Twofileness. A Functionalist Approach to Fictional Characters and Mental Files.Enrico Terrone - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (1):129-147.
References found in this work
A Subject with no Object.Zoltan Gendler Szabo, John P. Burgess & Gideon Rosen - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (1):106.
Language created, language independent entities.Stephen Schiffer - 1996 - Philosophical Topics 24 (1):149-167.