Erkenntnis 78 (6):1381-1403 (2013)

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John Cantwell
Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm
Abstract
This paper provides finitary jointly necessary and sufficient acceptance and rejection conditions for the logical constants of a first order quantificational language. By introducing the notion of making an assignment as a distinct object level practice—something you do with a sentence—(as opposed to a meta-level semantic notion) and combining this with the practice of (hypothetical and categorical) acceptance and rejection and the practice of making suppositions one gains a structure that is sufficiently rich to fully characterize the class of classical first order theories. The analysis thus provides a way of characterizing classical first order quantification by expressivist means
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-012-9421-4
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References found in this work BETA

The Logical Basis of Metaphysics.Michael Dummett - 1991 - Harvard University Press.
Natural Deduction: A Proof-Theoretical Study.Dag Prawitz - 1965 - Stockholm, Sweden: Dover Publications.

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Citations of this work BETA

Reasons, Inescapability and Persuasion.Neil Sinclair - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2823-2844.
Unity and Autonomy in Expressivist Logic.John Cantwell - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (3):443-457.
An Expressivist Bilateral Meaning-is-Use Analysis of Classical Propositional Logic.John Cantwell - 2015 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 24 (1):27-51.

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