Logical Concepts and Logical Inferences

Dialectica 58 (3):395-411 (2004)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Some philosophers find the following thesis attractive: for every logical constant C there is a set of logical rules of inference R such that a subject knows the meaning of C if and only if she accepts the rules in R. I point out some obvious but, apparently, easily forgotten difficulties concerning this thesis.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 94,045

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-02-22

Downloads
9 (#1,270,450)

6 months
3 (#1,208,833)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology.Annalisa Coliva - 2015 - London, England: Palgrave-Macmillan.
John Cook Wilson.Mathieu Marion - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
More Reflections on Consequence.Julien Murzi & Massimiliano Carrara - 2014 - Logique Et Analyse 57 (227):223-258.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

The Logical Basis of Metaphysics.Michael Dummett, Hilary Putnam & James Conant - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (177):519-527.
Knowledge of Logic.Paul Boghossian - 2000 - In Paul Artin Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
A Study of Concepts.Robert Hanna - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (3):541.
New Essays on the A Priori.L. Bonjour - 2002 - Mind 111 (443):647-652.
How Are A Priori Truths Possible?1.Christopher Peacocke - 1993 - European Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):175-199.

Add more references