Logical concepts and logical inferences

Dialectica 58 (3):395–411 (2004)
Abstract
Some philosophers find the following thesis attractive: for every logical constant C there is a set of logical rules of inference R such that a subject knows the meaning of C if and only if she accepts the rules in R. I point out some obvious but, apparently, easily forgotten difficulties concerning this thesis
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2004.tb00313.x
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References found in this work BETA
How Are A Priori Truths Possible?Christopher Peacocke - 1993 - European Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):175-199.

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Paolo Casalegno's Good Points.Elisa Paganini - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (2):215-219.

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