Determinable Properties and Overdetermination of Causal Powers

Philosophia 42 (3):695-711 (2014)

Abstract
Do determinable properties such as colour, mass, and height exist in addition to their corresponding determinates, being red, having a mass of 1 kilogram, and having a height of 2 metres? Optimists say yes, pessimists say no. Among the latter are Carl Gillett and Bradley Rives who argue that optimism leads to systematic overdetermination of causal powers and hence should be rejected on the grounds that the position is ontologically unparsimonious. In this paper I defend optimism against this charge by showing that overdetermination of causal powers cannot plausibly be avoided when grounding what I call joint powers. It is therefore not clear why the optimist should be worried about the overdetermination of causal powers that follows from positing determinable properties
Keywords Metaphysics  Properties  Causal powers  Determination  Ontological parsimony
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11406-014-9517-y
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 39,645
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Physical Realization.Sydney Shoemaker - 2007 - Oxford University Press UK.
Mental Causation.Stephen Yablo - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):245-280.
Is There a Fundamental Level?Jonathan Schaffer - 2003 - Noûs 37 (3):498–517.

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Individualism, Causal Powers, and Explanation.Robert A. Wilson - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (2):103-39.
Against A Priori Arguments for Individualism.Robert A. Wilson - 1993 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1):60-79.
Humean Dispositionalism.Toby Handfield - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):113-126.
Properties, Powers, and the Subset Account of Realization.Paul Audi - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):654-674.
Exclusion, Overdetermination, and Vacuity.Daniel Lim - 2011 - Southwest Philosophy Review 27 (1):57-64.
Emergence and Reflexive Downward.John Symons - 2010 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 6 (1):183-201.
Four Theories of Pure Dispositions.William A. Bauer - 2012 - In Alexander Bird, Brian Ellis & Howard Sankey (eds.), Properties, Powers, and Structures: Issues in the Metaphysics of Realism. Routledge. pp. 139-162.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-01-23

Total views
65 ( #112,893 of 2,325,984 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
9 ( #142,079 of 2,325,984 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature