On an unsound proof of the existence of possible worlds

Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 30 (4):598-603 (1989)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper, an argument of Alvin Plantinga's for the existence of abstract possible worlds is shown to be unsound. The argument is based on a principle Plantinga calls "Quasicompactness", due to its structural similarity to the notion of compactness in first-order logic. The principle is shown to be false.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1305/ndjfl/1093635242

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,779

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

First cause existence from propositional compactness.Ali Bleybel - manuscript
Against Logically Possible World-Relativized Existence.Dale Jacquette - 2014 - Metaphysica 15 (1).
On Set Theoretic Possible Worlds.Christopher Menzel - 1986 - Analysis 46 (2):68 - 72.
Set Theory, Topology, and the Possibility of Junky Worlds.Thomas Mormann - 2014 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 55 (1): 79 - 90.
Lewis' Argument for Possible Worlds.David Vander Laan - 2011-09-16 - In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments. Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 76–78.
Who's Afraid of Impossible Worlds?Edwin D. Mares - 1997 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):516-526.
The Evil That Free Will Does: Plantinga’s Dubious Defense.Mark Maller - 2021 - Metaphysica (1).
A Kantian Critique of David Lewis's Modal Realism.Thomas Doty Eudaly - 1989 - Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
In so many possible worlds.Kit Fine - 1972 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 13 (4):516-520.
A problem for actualism about possible worlds.Alan McMichael - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (1):49-66.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-08-24

Downloads
99 (#172,178)

6 months
6 (#701,066)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Christopher Menzel
Texas A&M University

Citations of this work

In Defense of the Possibilism–Actualism Distinction.Christopher Menzel - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (7):1971-1997.
Possible Worlds.Christopher Menzel - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Fundamental Theorem of World Theory.Christopher Menzel & Edward N. Zalta - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43:333-363.
The meaning of 'actually'.Yannis Stephanou - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (2):153-185.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references