Aristotle’s Argument from Truth in Metaphysics Γ 4

Analysis 79 (1):17-24 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Some of Aristotle’s statements about the indemonstrability of the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC) in Metaphysics Γ 4 merit more attention. The consensus seems to be that Aristotle provides two arguments against the demonstrability of the PNC, with one located in Γ 3 and the other found in the first paragraph of Γ 4. In this article, I argue that Aristotle also relies upon a third argument for the same conclusion: the argument from truth. Although Aristotle does not explicitly state this argument, it is the best argument that he could use to defend some of his statements in the second paragraph of Γ 4. Since the argument relies on only a few of Aristotle’s core views about truth, I propose that it is faithful to his considered position throughout his corpus, and it may be the strongest argument he could offer for the indemonstrability of the PNC.


Added to PP

147 (#131,712)

6 months
674 (#1,918)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Graham Clay
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Citations of this work

Aristotle on Non-contradiction.Paula Gottlieb - 2023 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Intuitions about cases as evidence (for how we should think).James Andow - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation.Jonathan Barnes - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 176 (4):493-494.

Add more references