Related categories

160 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 160
  1. Logic, Reasoning and Revision.Patrick Allo - 2016 - Theoria 82 (1):3-31.
    The traditional connection between logic and reasoning has been under pressure ever since Gilbert Harman attacked the received view that logic yields norms for what we should believe. In this article I first place Harman's challenge in the broader context of the dialectic between logical revisionists like Bob Meyer and sceptics about the role of logic in reasoning like Harman. I then develop a formal model based on contemporary epistemic and doxastic logic in which the relation between logic and norms (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Acceptable Contradictions: Pragmatics or Semantics? A Reply to Cobreros Et Al. [REVIEW]Sam Alxatib, Peter Pagin & Uli Sauerland - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (4):619-634.
    Naive speakers find some logical contradictions acceptable, specifically borderline contradictions involving vague predicates such as Joe is and isn’t tall. In a recent paper, Cobreros et al. (J Philos Logic, 2012) suggest a pragmatic account of the acceptability of borderline contradictions. We show, however, that the pragmatic account predicts the wrong truth conditions for some examples with disjunction. As a remedy, we propose a semantic analysis instead. The analysis is close to a variant of fuzzy logic, but conjunction and disjunction (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  3. The Psychology of Vagueness: Borderline Cases and Contradictions.Sam Alxatib & Francis Jeffry Pelletier - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (3):287-326.
    In an interesting experimental study, Bonini et al. (1999) present partial support for truth-gap theories of vagueness. We say this despite their claim to find theoretical and empirical reasons to dismiss gap theories and despite the fact that they favor an alternative, epistemic account, which they call ‘vagueness as ignorance’. We present yet more experimental evidence that supports gap theories, and argue for a semantic/pragmatic alternative that unifies the gappy supervaluationary approach together with its glutty relative, the subvaluationary approach.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  4. Paraconsistency on the Rocks of Dialetheism.Conrad Amus - 2012 - Logique Et Analyse 55 (217):3-21.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. ‘Neither–Nor’ Statements and ‘Neither–Nor’ States.Constantin Antonopoulos - 1993 - History and Philosophy of Logic 14 (2):183-199.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  6. Ideal Paraconsistent Logics.O. Arieli, A. Avron & A. Zamansky - 2011 - Studia Logica 99 (1-3):31-60.
    We define in precise terms the basic properties that an ‘ideal propositional paraconsistent logic’ is expected to have, and investigate the relations between them. This leads to a precise characterization of ideal propositional paraconsistent logics. We show that every three-valued paraconsistent logic which is contained in classical logic, and has a proper implication connective, is ideal. Then we show that for every n > 2 there exists an extensive family of ideal n -valued logics, each one of which is not (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  7. No Consistent Way with Paradox.B. Armour-Garb - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):66-75.
    In ‘A Consistent Way with Paradox’, Laurence Goldstein (2009) clarifies his solution to the liar, which he touts as revenge immune . In addition, he (Ibid.) responds to one of the objections that Armour-Garb and Woodbridge (2006) raise against certain solutions to the open pair and argues that his proffered solution to the liar family of paradoxes undermines what they (Ibid.) call the dialetheic conjecture . In this paper, after critically evaluating Goldstein’s response to A-G&W, I turn to his proposed (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8. Wrestling with (and Without) Dialetheism.Bradley Armour-Garb - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):87 – 102.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  9. Diagnosing Dialetheism.Bradley Armour-Garb - 2004 - In Graham Priest, Jc Beall & Bradley P. Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction : New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 113--25.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  10. Can Deflationists Be Dialetheists?Bradley Armour-Garb & J. C. Beall - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (6):593-608.
    Philosophical work on truth covers two streams of inquiry, one concerning the nature (if any) of truth, the other concerning truth-related paradox, especially the Liar. For the most part these streams have proceeded fairly independently of each other. In his "Deflationary Truth and the Liar" (JPL 28:455-488, 1999) Keith Simmons argues that the two streams bear on one another in an important way; specifically, the Liar poses a greater problem for deflationary conceptions of truth than it does for inflationist conceptions. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  11. Liars, Truthtellers and Naysayers: A Broader View of Semantic Pathology I.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2012 - Language and Communication 32 (4):293-311.
    Semantic pathology is most widely recognized in the liar paradox, where an apparent inconsistency arises in ‘‘liar sentences’’ and their ilk. But the phenomenon of semantic pathology also manifests a sibling symptom—an apparent indeterminacy—which, while not largely discussed (save for the occasional nod to ‘‘truthteller sentences’’), is just as pervasive as, and exactly parallels, the symptom of inconsistency. Moreover, certain ‘‘dual symptom’’ cases, which we call naysayers, exhibit both inconsistency and indeterminacy and also manifest a higher-order indeterminacy between them. In (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  12. Dialetheism, Semantic Pathology, and the Open Pair.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):395 – 416.
    Over the past 25 years, Graham Priest has ably presented and defended dialetheism, the view that certain sentences are properly characterized as true with true negations. Our goal here is neither to quibble with the tenability of true, assertable contradictions nor, really, with the arguments for dialetheism. Rather, we wish to address the dialetheist's treatment of cases of semantic pathology and to pose a worry for dialetheism that has not been adequately considered. The problem that we present seems to have (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  13. Curried Katz with Epimenidean Dilemma.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2003 - Philosophical Forum 34 (3-4):351-366.
  14. Where in the (World Wide) Web of Belief is the Law of Non-Contradiction?Jack Arnold & Stewart Shapiro - 2007 - Noûs 41 (2):276–297.
    It is sometimes said that there are two, competing versions of W. V. O. Quine’s unrelenting empiricism, perhaps divided according to temporal periods of his career. According to one, logic is exempt from, or lies outside the scope of, the attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction. This logic-friendly Quine holds that logical truths and, presumably, logical inferences are analytic in the traditional sense. Logical truths are knowable a priori, and, importantly, they are incorrigible, and so immune from revision. The other, radical (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  15. Review: Robert McNaughton, Contradiction, the Logical Counterpart to Conflict. [REVIEW]Charles A. Baylis - 1957 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 22 (4):401-401.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Lupasco Stéphane. Valeurs Logiques Et Contradiction. Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Êtranger, Vol. 135 , Pp. 1–31. [REVIEW]Charles A. Baylis - 1946 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 11 (4):134.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Spandrels of Truth.J. C. Beall - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    In Spandrels of Truth, Beall concisely presents and defends a modest, so-called dialetheic theory of transparent truth.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   44 citations  
  18. Analetheism and Dialetheism.J. Beall & D. Ripley - 2004 - Analysis 64 (1):30-35.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  19. Future Contradictions.Jc Beall - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):547-557.
    A common and much-explored thought is ?ukasiewicz's idea that the future is ?indeterminate??i.e., ?gappy? with respect to some claims?and that such indeterminacy bleeds back into the present in the form of gappy ?future contingent? claims. What is uncommon, and to my knowledge unexplored, is the dual idea of an overdeterminate future?one which is ?glutty? with respect to some claims. While the direct dual, with future gluts bleeding back into the present, is worth noting, my central aim is simply to sketch (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  20. Dialetheists Against Pinocchio.Jc Beall - 2011 - Analysis 71 (4):689-691.
    This paper argues that, contrary to P. Eldridge-Smith, the so-called Pinocchio paradox affords no argument against ‘simply semantic dialetheism’.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  21. Should Deflationists Be Dialetheists?JC Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb - 2003 - Noûs 37 (2):303–324.
  22. Not so Deep Inconsistency: A Reply to Eklund.Jc Beall & Graham Priest - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Logic 5:74-84.
    In his “Deep Inconsistency?” Eklund attacks arguments to the effect that some contradictions are true, and especially those based on the liar paradox, to be found in Priest’ In Contradiction. The point of this paper is to evaluate his case.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  23. Absolute Contradiction, Dialetheism, and Revenge.Francesco Berto - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (2):193-207.
    Is there a notion of contradiction—let us call it, for dramatic effect, “absolute”—making all contradictions, so understood, unacceptable also for dialetheists? It is argued in this paper that there is, and that spelling it out brings some theoretical benefits. First it gives us a foothold on undisputed ground in the methodologically difficult debate on dialetheism. Second, we can use it to express, without begging questions, the disagreement between dialetheists and their rivals on the nature of truth. Third, dialetheism has an (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  24. Adynaton and Material Exclusion.Francesco Berto - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):165 – 190.
    Philosophical dialetheism, whose main exponent is Graham Priest, claims that some contradictions hold, are true, and it is rational to accept and assert them. Such a position is naturally portrayed as a challenge to the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC). But all the classic formulations of the LNC are, in a sense, not questioned by a typical dialetheist, since she is (cheerfully) required to accept them by her own theory. The goal of this paper is to develop a formulation of the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  25. How to Sell a Contradiction.Francesco Berto - 2007 - College Publications.
    There is a principle in things, about which we cannot be deceived, but must always, on the contrary, recognize the truth – viz. that the same thing cannot at one and the same time be and not be": with these words of the Metaphysics, Aristotle introduced the Law of Non-Contradiction, which was to become the most authoritative principle in the history of Western thought. However, things have recently changed, and nowadays various philosophers, called dialetheists, claim that this Law does not (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  26. Is Dialetheism an Idealism? The Russellian Fallacy and the Dialetheist’s Dilemma.Francesco Berto - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (2):235–263.
    In his famous work on vagueness, Russell named “fallacy of verbalism” the fallacy that consists in mistaking the properties of words for the properties of things. In this paper, I examine two (clusters of) mainstream paraconsistent logical theories – the non-adjunctive and relevant approaches –, and show that, if they are given a strongly paraconsistent or dialetheic reading, the charge of committing the Russellian Fallacy can be raised against them in a sophisticated way, by appealing to the intuitive reading of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  27. Teorie Dell'assurdo: I Rivali Del Principio di Non-Contraddizione.Francesco Berto - 2006 - Carocci.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  28. Characterizing Negation to Face Dialetheism.Francesco Berto - 2006 - Logique Et Analyse 49 (195):241-263.
  29. Meaning, Metaphysics, and Contradiction.Francesco Berto - 2006 - American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (4):283-297.
  30. Some Topics Concerning Identity and Contradiction in Philosophical Logic.Francesco Berto - 2005 - Epistemologia 28 (2):219-238.
  31. Paraconsistency: Logic and Applications.Francesco Berto, Edwin Mares, Koji Tanaka & Francesco Paoli (eds.) - 2013 - Springer.
    A logic is called 'paraconsistent' if it rejects the rule called 'ex contradictione quodlibet', according to which any conclusion follows from inconsistent premises. While logicians have proposed many technically developed paraconsistent logical systems and contemporary philosophers like Graham Priest have advanced the view that some contradictions can be true, and advocated a paraconsistent logic to deal with them, until recent times these systems have been little understood by philosophers. This book presents a comprehensive overview on paraconsistent logical systems to change (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  32. Dialetheism.Francesco Berto, Graham Priest & Zach Weber - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2018 (2018).
    A dialetheia is a sentence, A, such that both it and its negation, ¬A, are true (we shall talk of sentences throughout this entry; but one could run the definition in terms of propositions, statements, or whatever one takes as her favourite truth-bearer: this would make little difference in the context). Assuming the fairly uncontroversial view that falsity just is the truth of negation, it can equally be claimed that a dialetheia is a sentence which is both true and false.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  33. Contradiction or Non-Contradiction? Hegel's Dialectic Between Brandom and Priest.Michela Bordignon - 2012 - Verifiche: Rivista Trimestrale di Scienze Umane 41 (1-3).
    The aim of the paper is to analyse Brandom’s account of Hegel’s conception of determinate negation and the role this structure plays in the dialectical process with respect to the problem of contradiction. After having shown both the merits and the limits of Brandom’s account, I will refer to Priest’s dialetheistic approach to contradiction as an alternative contemporary perspective from which it is possible to capture essential features of Hegel’s notion of contradiction, and I will test the equation of Hegel’s (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. Contradictio Regula Veri. La Contraddizione Nella Logica Hegeliana.Michela Bordignon - unknown
    The dissertation faces the problem of the meaning and the function of contradiction within Hegelian logical system. The dissertation is made of six chapters. The first one highlights the ambiguity of the contradiction within Hegel’s logic. Contradiction has three main meanings: first, the metaphorical meaning (contradiction denotes a strong but not contradictory opposition); second, contradiction has a critical-negative value and corresponds to the mistake of Understanding; third, contradiction is characterized by a properly contradictory structure and, at the same time, it (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Contradiction and Reality.Bernard Bosanquet - 1906 - Mind 15 (57):1-12.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. The Logic of Truth in Paraconsistent Internal Realism.Manuel Bremer - 2008 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (1):76-83.
    The paper discusses which modal principles should hold for a truth operator answering to the truth theory of internal realism. It turns out that the logic of truth in internal realism is isomorphic to the modal system S4.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. Why and How to Be a Dialetheist.Manuel Bremer - 2008 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (2):208-227.
    In the first part the paper rehearses the main arguments why to be a dialetheist (i.e. why to assume that some contradictions are true). Dialetheism, however, has been criticised as irrational or self-refutating. Therefore the second part of the paper outlines one way to make dialetheism rational assertable. True contradictions turn out to be both believable and assertable. The argument proceeds by setting out basic principles of assertion and denial, and employing bivalent truth value operators.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. Believing and Asserting Contradictions.Manuel Bremer - 2007 - Logique Et Analyse (200):341.
    The debate around “strong” paraconsistency or dialetheism (the view that there are true contradictions) has – apart from metaphysical concerns - centred on the questions whether dialetheism itself can be definitely asserted or has a unique truth value, and what it should mean, if it is possible at all, to believe a contradiction one knows to be contradictory (i.e. an explicit contradiction). And what should it mean, if it is possible at all, to assert a sentence one knows to be (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  39. Can Contradictions Be Asserted?Manuel Bremer - 1999 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 7:167.
    In a universal logic containing naive semantics the semantic antinomies will be provable. Although being provable they are not assertiblebecause of some pragmatic constraints on assertion I will argue for. Furthermore, since it is not acceptable that the thesis of dialethism is a dialethiaitself, what it would be according to naive semantics and the prefered logical systems of dialethism, a corresponding restriction on proof theory isnecessary.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. Logical Non-Apriorism and the Law of Non-Contradiction.Otávio Bueno & Mark Colyvan - 2004 - In Graham Priest, Jc Beall & Bradley P. Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction : New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 156--175.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  41. True, False, Paranormal and 'Designated'?: A Reply to Jenkins.Colin Ready Caret & Aaron Cotnoir - 2008 - Analysis 68 (3):238–244.
    Jenkins (2007) charges that the language advanced in Beall (2007) is either expressively impoverished, or inconsistent. We argue that Jenkins’ objections are based on unreasonably strong constraints on formal theories of truth. Our primary concern is not to defend the ‘paranormal’ framework advanced in Beall, but to respond to a common – and implausible – ‘revenge’-style charge directed at a certain class of formal theories of truth and paradox.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  42. Spandrels of Truth, by Jc Beall. [REVIEW]Colin Caret & David Ripley - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):503-507.
  43. Contradiction.Sri Chandra - 1983 - Indian Philosophical Quarterly 10 (4):465.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. Review: Everett J. Nelson, A Note on Contradiction. [REVIEW]Alonzo Church - 1936 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 1 (3):117-117.
  45. Aristotle’s Argument From Truth in Metaphysics Γ 4.Graham Clay - forthcoming - Analysis:any004.
    Some of Aristotle’s statements about the indemonstrability of the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC) in Metaphysics Γ 4 merit more attention. The consensus seems to be that Aristotle provides two arguments against the demonstrability of the PNC, with one located in Γ 3 and the other found in the first paragraph of Γ 4. In this article, I argue that Aristotle also relies upon a third argument for the same conclusion: the argument from truth. Although Aristotle does not explicitly state this (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. Paraconsistent Vagueness: A Positive Argument.Pablo Cobreros - 2011 - Synthese 183 (2):211-227.
    Paraconsistent approaches have received little attention in the literature on vagueness (at least compared to other proposals). The reason seems to be that many philosophers have found the idea that a contradiction might be true (or that a sentence and its negation might both be true) hard to swallow. Even advocates of paraconsistency on vagueness do not look very convinced when they consider this fact; since they seem to have spent more time arguing that paraconsistent theories are at least as (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  47. Reality and Contradiction.Jonas Cohn - 1939 - Philosophical Review 48 (4):381-397.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. La Dialectique: Tradition Et Actualité. La Contradiction Dialectique Et la Non-Contradiction.L. Coletti - 1988 - Studia Filozoficzne 274:151-167.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. Review of Doris Olin's Paradox. [REVIEW]John R. Cook - 2005 - Philosophy in Review (6):422-424.
    Doris Olin's Paradox is a very helpful book for those who want to be introduced to the philosophical treatment of paradoxes, or for those who already have knowledge of the general area and would like to have a helpful resource book.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. On Contradiction.Maria L. Corte-Real - 1991 - Analecta Husserliana 34:493.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 160