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  1. On Falsifying Empirical Contradictions.Luis Felipe Bartolo Alegre - manuscript
    The possibility of testing contradictory statements about the factual world has been suggested but barely discussed in the relevant literature. Here I argue that if we assume that there are contradictory observation sentences, it would be logically impossible to falsify them. Accordingly, the extension of the dialetheist programme into empirical science would be non-advisable, for it would introduce logically unfalsifiable claims.
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  2. The Proper Treatment of Identity in Dialetheic Metaphysics.Nicholas K. Jones - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.
    According to one prominent strand of mainstream logic and metaphysics, identity is indistinguishability. Priest has recently argued that this permits counterexamples to the transitivity and substitutivity of identity within dialetheic metaphysics, even in paradigmatically extensional contexts. This paper investigates two alternative regimentations of indistinguishability. Although classically equivalent to the standard regimentation on which Priest focuses, these alternatives are strictly stronger than it in dialetheic settings. Both regimentations are transitive, and one satisfies substitutivity. It is argued that both regimentations provide better (...)
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  3. Impossible Worlds, by Francesco Berto and Mark Jago. [REVIEW]Koji Tanaka - forthcoming - Mind.
    Book Review of Impossible Worlds, by Francesco Berto and Mark Jago. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.
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  4. Friedrich Engels: Emergenz und Dialektik.Kaan Kangal - 2020 - Widerspruch 70:43-56.
  5. Über Poppers Forderung nach Widerspruchlosigkeit.Luis Felipe Bartolo Alegre - 2019 - Felsefe Arkivi 51:31-36.
    Popper restricted his definition of falsifiability to consistent theories through what we may call his requirement of consistency. His main argument was that an inconsistent theory does not distinguish the sentences that corroborate it from those that contradict it, for all sentences follow from it. I propose to replace this requirement by the more basic requirement that the classes of potential corroborators and falsifiers of a theory do not overlap. This results not only in an unrestricted definition of falsifiability but (...)
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  6. Logical Revision by Counterexamples: A Case Study of the Paraconsistent Counterexample to Ex Contradictione Quodlibet.Seungrak Choi - 2019 - In Proceedings of the 14th and 15th Asian Logic Conferences. pp. 141-167.
    It is often said that a correct logical system should have no counterexample to its logical rules and the system must be revised if its rules have a counterexample. If a logical system (or theory) has a counterexample to its logical rules, do we have to revise the system? In this paper, focussing on the role of counterexamples to logical rules, we deal with the question. -/- We investigate two mutually exclusive theories of arithmetic - intuitionistic and paraconsistent theories. The (...)
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  7. Aristotle’s Argument From Truth in Metaphysics Γ 4.Graham Clay - 2019 - Analysis 79 (1):17-24.
    Some of Aristotle’s statements about the indemonstrability of the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC) in Metaphysics Γ 4 merit more attention. The consensus seems to be that Aristotle provides two arguments against the demonstrability of the PNC, with one located in Γ 3 and the other found in the first paragraph of Γ 4. In this article, I argue that Aristotle also relies upon a third argument for the same conclusion: the argument from truth. Although Aristotle does not explicitly state this (...)
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  8. Замечания о невозможности, неполноте Paraconsistency, Нерешающость, Случайность вычислительности, парадокс, и неопределенность в Чайтин, Витгенштейн, Хофштадтер Вольперт, Дориа, да Коста, Годель, Сирл, Родыч Берто, Флойд, Мойал-Шаррок и Янофски.Michael Richard Starks - 2019 - Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press.
    Принято считать, что невозможность, неполнота, Парапоследовательность, Несоответствие, Случайность, вычислительность, парадокс, неопределенность и пределы разума являются разрозненными научными физическими или математическими вопросами, имеющими мало или ничего общего. Я полагаю, что они в значительной степени стандартные философские проблемы (т.е. языковые игры), которые были в основном решены Витгенштейном более 80 лет назад. -/- Я предоставляю краткое резюме некоторых из основных выводов двух из самых выдающихся студентов поведения о Fсовременности, Людвиг Витгенштейн и Джон Сирл, на логическую структуру преднамеренности (ум, язык, поведение), принимая в качестве (...)
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  9. ملاحظات على استحالة, عدم اكتمال, بارااتساق,عدم تحديد, عشوائية, الحوسبة, مفارقة, وعدم اليقين في Chaitin, Wittgenstein, Hofstadter, Wolpert, دوريا, دا كوستا, جوديل, سيرل, روديش, بيرتو, فلويد, مويال شاروك ويانوفسكي.Michael Richard Starks - 2019 - Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press.
    ويعتقد عادة أن الاستحالة، وعدم اكتمال، وParaconsistency، وعدم تحديد، العشوائية، والحوسبة، والمفارقة، وعدم اليقين وحدود العقل هي قضايا علمية مادية أو رياضية متباينة وجود القليل أو لا شيء في المشتركه. أقترح أنها مشاكل فلسفية قياسية إلى حد كبير (أي ألعاب اللغة) التي تم حلها في الغالب من قبل فيتغنشتاين أكثر من 80years منذ. -/- "إن ما نميل إلى قوله في مثل هذه الحالة هو، بطبيعة الحال، ليس فلسفة، ولكنه مادة خام. وهكذا، على سبيل المثال، ما يميل عالم الرياضيات إلى قوله (...)
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  10. ¿Qué significa paraconsistente, indescifrable, aleatorio, computable e incompleto? Una revisión de la Manera de Godel: explota en un mundo indecible (Godel’s Way: exploits into an undecidable world) por Gregory Chaitin, Francisco A Doria, Newton C.A. da Costa 160P (2012) (revisión revisada 2019).Michael Richard Starks - 2019 - In Observaciones Sobre Imposibilidad, Incompleta, Paracoherencia,Indecisión,Aleatoriedad, Computabilidad, Paradoja E Incertidumbre En Chaitin, Wittgenstein, Hofstadter, Wolpert, Doria, Dacosta, Godel, Searle, Rodych, Berto,Floyd, Moyal-Sharrock Y Yanofsky. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 44-63.
    En ' Godel’s Way ', tres eminentes científicos discuten temas como la indecisión, la incompleta, la aleatoriedad, la computabilidad y la paraconsistencia. Me acerco a estas cuestiones desde el punto de vista de Wittgensteinian de que hay dos cuestiones básicas que tienen soluciones completamente diferentes. Existen las cuestiones científicas o empíricas, que son hechos sobre el mundo que necesitan ser investigados observacionalmente y cuestiones filosóficas en cuanto a cómo el lenguaje se puede utilizar inteligiblemente (que incluyen ciertas preguntas en matemáticas (...)
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  11. Reseña de ‘Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy’ de Paul Horwich 248p (2013) (revisión revisada 2019).Michael Richard Starks - 2019 - In Delirios Utópicos Suicidas en el Siglo 21 La filosofía, la naturaleza humana y el colapso de la civilización Artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 4TH Edición. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 145-167.
    The first group of articles attempt to give some insight into how we behave that is reasonably free of theoretical delusions. In the next three groups I comment on three of the principal delusions preventing a sustainable world— technology, religion and politics (cooperative groups). People believe that society can be saved by them, so I provide some suggestions in the rest of the book as to why this is unlikely via short articles and reviews of recent books by well-known writers. (...)
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  12. Priest’s Anti-Exceptionalism, Candrakīrti and Paraconsistency.Koji Tanaka - 2019 - In Can Başkent & Thomas Macaulay Ferguson (eds.), Graham Priest on Dialetheism and Paraconsistency. Dordrecht: Springer Verlag. pp. 127-138.
    Priest holds anti-exceptionalism about logic. That is, he holds that logic, as a theory, does not have any exceptional status in relation to the theories of empirical sciences. Crucial to Priest’s anti-exceptionalism is the existence of ‘data’ that can force the revision of logical theory. He claims that classical logic is inadequate to the available data and, thus, needs to be revised. But what kind of data can overturn classical logic? Priest claims that the data is our intuitions about the (...)
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  13. Interpolation in 16-Valued Trilattice Logics.Reinhard Muskens & Stefan Wintein - 2018 - Studia Logica 106 (2):345-370.
    In a recent paper we have defined an analytic tableau calculus PL_16 for a functionally complete extension of Shramko and Wansing's logic based on the trilattice SIXTEEN_3. This calculus makes it possible to define syntactic entailment relations that capture central semantic relations of the logic---such as the relations |=_t, |=_f, and |=_i that each correspond to a lattice order in SIXTEEN_3; and |=, the intersection of |=_t and |=_f,. -/- It turns out that our method of characterising these semantic relations---as (...)
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  14. A Normative Argument Against Explosion.Mark Pinder - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):61-70.
    One strategy for defending paraconsistent logics involves raising ‘normative arguments’ against the inference rule explosion. Florian Steinberger systematically criticises a wide variety of formulations of such arguments. I argue that, for one such formulation, Steinberger's criticisms fail. I then sketch an argument, available to those who deny dialetheism, in defence of the formulation in question.
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  15. Ambivalence, Emotional Perceptions, and the Concern with Objectivity.Hili Razinsky - 2017 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 4 (2):211-228.
    Hili Razinsky, free downlad at link. ABSTRACT: Emotional perceptions are objectivist (objectivity-directed or cognitive) and conscious, both attributes suggesting they cannot be ambivalent. Yet perceptions, including emotional perceptions of value, allow for strictly objectivist ambivalence in which a person unitarily perceives the object in mutually undermining ways. Emotional perceptions became an explicandum of emotion for philosophers who are sensitive to the unique conscious character of emotion, impressed by the objectivist character of perceptions, and believe that the perceptual account solves a (...)
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  16. What Do Paraconsistent, Undecidable, Random, Computable and Incomplete Mean? A Review of Godel's Way: Exploits Into an Undecidable World by Gregory Chaitin, Francisco A Doria , Newton C.A. Da Costa 160p (2012).Michael Starks - 2017 - Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization -- Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 3rd Ed 686p(2017).
    In ‘Godel’s Way’ three eminent scientists discuss issues such as undecidability, incompleteness, randomness, computability and paraconsistency. I approach these issues from the Wittgensteinian viewpoint that there are two basic issues which have completely different solutions. There are the scientific or empirical issues, which are facts about the world that need to be investigated observationally and philosophical issues as to how language can be used intelligibly (which include certain questions in mathematics and logic), which need to be decided by looking at (...)
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  17. Logic, Reasoning and Revision.Patrick Allo - 2016 - Theoria 82 (1):3-31.
    The traditional connection between logic and reasoning has been under pressure ever since Gilbert Harman attacked the received view that logic yields norms for what we should believe. In this article I first place Harman's challenge in the broader context of the dialectic between logical revisionists like Bob Meyer and sceptics about the role of logic in reasoning like Harman. I then develop a formal model based on contemporary epistemic and doxastic logic in which the relation between logic and norms (...)
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  18. Review: Graham Priest, One: Being an Investigation Into the Unity of Reality and of its Parts, Including the Singular Object Which is Nothingness. [REVIEW]Chad McIntosh - 2016 - Philosophy in Review 36 (3):130-132.
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  19. Saving Proof From Paradox: Gödel’s Paradox and the Inconsistency of Informal Mathematics.Fenner Stanley Tanswell - 2016 - In Peter Verdee & Holger Andreas (eds.), Logical Studies of Paraconsistent Reasoning in Science and Mathematics. Springer. pp. 159-173.
    In this paper I shall consider two related avenues of argument that have been used to make the case for the inconsistency of mathematics: firstly, Gödel’s paradox which leads to a contradiction within mathematics and, secondly, the incompatibility of completeness and consistency established by Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. By bringing in considerations from the philosophy of mathematical practice on informal proofs, I suggest that we should add to the two axes of completeness and consistency a third axis of formality and informality. (...)
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  20. What Is an Inconsistent Truth Table?Zach Weber, Guillermo Badia & Patrick Girard - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):533-548.
    ABSTRACTDo truth tables—the ordinary sort that we use in teaching and explaining basic propositional logic—require an assumption of consistency for their construction? In this essay we show that truth tables can be built in a consistency-independent paraconsistent setting, without any appeal to classical logic. This is evidence for a more general claim—that when we write down the orthodox semantic clauses for a logic, whatever logic we presuppose in the background will be the logic that appears in the foreground. Rather than (...)
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  21. The Logic of Enlightenment.Dave S. Henley - 2015 - Iff Books.
    This work proposes a logical analysis for the kind of knowledge or insight provided by Buddhist enlightenment, which is often presented only in the form of contradictions and riddles. The comprehension of contradictions is perplexing to most western logic, and yet developed here is a theory demonstrating how a non truth-functional interpretation can be attached to certain naturalistic contradictions. In this way, the logical and psychological status of Enlightenment can be analysed in a manner consistent with the claims of much (...)
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  22. Some (Critical) Remarks on Priest's Dialetheist Reading of Nagarjuna.Goran Kardaš - 2015 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 11 (2):35--49.
    Graham Priest in collaboration with J. Garfield and Y. Deguchi (henceforth: DGP) wrote several articles and responses arguing that the Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna was a dialetheist thinker, i.e. that he not just identified and exposed certain contradictions but that he embraced it. These contradictions, according to DGP, always occur ``at the limits of thought'' i.e. when a certain view at the same time transcends the limit (``transcendence'') and is within that limit (``closure''). In Nagarjuna's case, these limital contradictions arise at (...)
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  23. Hegel's Dialectics: Logic, Consciousness and History.Nenad Miščević - 2015 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 11 (2):21--34.
    Graham Priest has brilliantly analyzed Hegel's dialectics, as far as its logical and abstract ontological (metaphysical) structure goes, and has successfully related it to his own logically sophisticated dialethism. After briefly reminding the reader of his account, the paper turns to the other, not purely logical side of Hegel's dialectics, and points to his strategy of bringing together ontological, anthropological and historical matters together with the logical structure, in a manner quite foreign to analytic tradition. It concludes with the proposal (...)
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  24. Speaking of the Ineffable, East and West.Graham Priest - 2015 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 11 (2):6--20.
    There is a phenomenon that often arises when a philosophy argues that there are limits to thought/language, and tries to justify this view by giving reasons as to why there are things about which one cannot think/talk---in the process appearing to give the lie to the claim. I will be concerned with that phenomenon. We will look at some of philosophies that fall into this camp (those of Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Mahayana Buddhism). We will then see that Buddhist philosophy has (...)
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  25. Assertion, Denial, Acceptance, Rejection, Symmetry, and Paradox.Greg Restall - 2015 - In Colin R. Caret & Ole T. Hjortland (eds.), Foundations of Logical Consequence. Oxford University Press. pp. 310-321.
    Proponents of “truth-value glut” responses to the paradoxes of self-reference, such as Priest [6, 7] argue that “truth-value gap” analyses of the paradoxes fall foul of the strengthened liar paradox: “this sentence is not true.” If we pay attention to the role of assertion and denial and the behaviour of negation in both “gap” and “glut” analyses, we see that the situation with these approaches has a pleasing symmetry: gap approaches take some denials to fail to be expressible by negation, (...)
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  26. A Social Pragmatic View on the Concept of Normative Consistency.Berislav Žarnić - 2015 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 11 (2):56--78.
    The programmatic statement put forward in von Wright's last works on deontic logic introduces the perspective of logical pragmatics, which has been formally explicated here and extended so to include the role of norm-recipient as well as the role of norm-giver. Using the translation function from the language of deontic logic to the language of set-theoretical approach, the connection has been established between the deontic postulates, on one side, and the perfection properties of the norm-set and the counter-set, on the (...)
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  27. Absolute Contradiction, Dialetheism, and Revenge.Francesco Berto - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (2):193-207.
    Is there a notion of contradiction—let us call it, for dramatic effect, “absolute”—making all contradictions, so understood, unacceptable also for dialetheists? It is argued in this paper that there is, and that spelling it out brings some theoretical benefits. First it gives us a foothold on undisputed ground in the methodologically difficult debate on dialetheism. Second, we can use it to express, without begging questions, the disagreement between dialetheists and their rivals on the nature of truth. Third, dialetheism has an (...)
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  28. On the Possibility of Realist Dialetheism.Luis Estrada-Gonzáles - 2014 - SATS 15 (2):197-217.
    Realist dialetheism is the view that there are contradictions in reality. One argument against this idea says that it is impossible because it has to make room for the possibility of a trivial reality, which is metaphysically impossible. Another argument against it says that the metaphysical structure of reality is such that it is impossible to have contradictions in it. I argue here that both arguments fail to establish the impossibility of realist dialetheism because they are based on a misconception (...)
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  29. Constructive Methodological Deflationism, Dialetheism and the Liar.David Liggins - 2014 - Analysis 74 (4):566-574.
    Thanks to the work of Kendall Walton, appeals to the notion of pretence (or make-believe) have become popular in philosophy. Now the notion has begun to appear in accounts of truth. My aim here is to assess one of these accounts, namely the ‘constructive methodological deflationism’ put forward by Jc Beall. After introducing the view, I argue that Beall does not manage to overcome the problem of psychological implausibility. Although Beall claims that constructive methodological deflationism supports dialetheism, I argue that (...)
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  30. Dialectics, Infinity and the Absolute: Response to Skempton.Paul Livingston - 2014 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (3):402-408.
  31. The Justice of Contradiction.Angelica Nuzzo - 2014 - In Elena Ficara (ed.), Contradictions: Logic, History, Actuality. De Gruyter. pp. 109-126.
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  32. An Outline for Ambivalence of Value Judgment.Hili Razinsky - 2014 - Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (3):469-488.
    I shall argue, however, that there can be genuine ambivalence between a judgment that A is v and a judgment that A is not v. Such ambivalence may, moreover, be precisely of the kind that appears to be either impossible or destructive for ethics. Objectivist ambivalence, as we shall call it, is neither an accidental nor peripheral feature of our value discourse. At the same time it is not destructive to ethics or to value judgments in general, but only to (...)
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  33. Acceptable Contradictions: Pragmatics or Semantics? A Reply to Cobreros Et Al. [REVIEW]Sam Alxatib, Peter Pagin & Uli Sauerland - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (4):619-634.
    Naive speakers find some logical contradictions acceptable, specifically borderline contradictions involving vague predicates such as Joe is and isn’t tall. In a recent paper, Cobreros et al. (J Philos Logic, 2012) suggest a pragmatic account of the acceptability of borderline contradictions. We show, however, that the pragmatic account predicts the wrong truth conditions for some examples with disjunction. As a remedy, we propose a semantic analysis instead. The analysis is close to a variant of fuzzy logic, but conjunction and disjunction (...)
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  34. Paraconsistency: Logic and Applications.Francesco Berto, Edwin Mares, Koji Tanaka & Francesco Paoli (eds.) - 2013 - Springer.
    A logic is called 'paraconsistent' if it rejects the rule called 'ex contradictione quodlibet', according to which any conclusion follows from inconsistent premises. While logicians have proposed many technically developed paraconsistent logical systems and contemporary philosophers like Graham Priest have advanced the view that some contradictions can be true, and advocated a paraconsistent logic to deal with them, until recent times these systems have been little understood by philosophers. This book presents a comprehensive overview on paraconsistent logical systems to change (...)
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  35. Dialectic and Dialetheism.Elena Ficara - 2013 - History and Philosophy of Logic 34 (1):35-52.
    In this article, I consider the possibility of interpreting Hegel’s dialectic as dialetheism. After a first basic recapitulation about the meaning of the words ‘dialetheism’ and ‘dialectic’ and a consideration of Priest’s own account of the relation between dialectical and dialetheic logic in 1989, I discuss some controversial issues, not directly considered by Priest. As a matter of fact, the reflection on paraconsistent logics and dialetheism has enormously grown in recent years. In addition, the reception of Hegel’s logic and metaphysics (...)
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  36. Non-Contradiction: Oh Yeah and so What?: Nelson Non-Contradiction.Mark T. Nelson - 2013 - Think 12 (34):87-91.
    ExtractThe logical Law of Non-contradiction – that a proposition cannot be both true and false – enjoys a special, perhaps uniquely privileged, status in philosophy. Most philosophers think that finding a contradiction – the assertion of both P and not-P – in one's reasoning is the best possible evidence that something has gone wrong, the ultimate refutation of a position. But why should this be so? What reason do we have to believe it?Send article to KindleTo send this article to (...)
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  37. Non-Contradiction: Oh Yeah and So What?Mark T. Nelson - 2013 - Think 12 (34):87-91.
    The logical Law of Non-contradiction – that a proposition cannot be both true and false – enjoys a special, perhaps uniquely privileged, status in philosophy. Most philosophers think that finding a contradiction – the assertion of both P and not-P – in one's reasoning is the best possible evidence that something has gone wrong, the ultimate refutation of a position. But why should this be so? What reason do we have to believe it? In this paper, I address these questions.
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  38. Too Good to Be “Just True”.Marcus Rossberg - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-8.
    Paraconsistent and dialetheist approaches to a theory of truth are faced with a problem: the expressive resources of the logic do not suffice to express that a sentence is just true—i.e., true and not also false—or to express that a sentence is consistent. In his recent book, Spandrels of Truth, Jc Beall proposes a ‘just true’-operator to identify sentences that are true and not also false. Beall suggests seven principles that a ‘just true’-operator must fulfill, and proves that his operator (...)
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  39. Contradictions in Dōgen.Koji Tanaka - 2013 - Philosophy East and West 63 (3):322-334.
    In "The Way of the Dialetheist: Contradictions in Buddhism," Yasuo Deguchi, Jay L. Garfield, and Graham Priest argue that some (though not all) of the contradictions that appear in Buddhist texts should be accepted. An examination of their argument depends on what sort(s) of negation is (are) used in the texts. In order to see apparently contradictory statements as affirmations of true contradictions, we must assume that 'not' (or its variance) is used as a contradiction-forming operator. In this article, the (...)
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  40. Paraconsistency on the Rocks of Dialetheism.Conrad Amus - 2012 - Logique Et Analyse 55 (217):3-21.
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  41. No Consistent Way with Paradox.B. Armour-Garb - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):66-75.
    In ‘A Consistent Way with Paradox’, Laurence Goldstein (2009) clarifies his solution to the liar, which he touts as revenge immune . In addition, he (Ibid.) responds to one of the objections that Armour-Garb and Woodbridge (2006) raise against certain solutions to the open pair and argues that his proffered solution to the liar family of paradoxes undermines what they (Ibid.) call the dialetheic conjecture . In this paper, after critically evaluating Goldstein’s response to A-G&W, I turn to his proposed (...)
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  42. Liars, Truthtellers and Naysayers: A Broader View of Semantic Pathology I.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2012 - Language and Communication 32 (4):293-311.
    Semantic pathology is most widely recognized in the liar paradox, where an apparent inconsistency arises in ‘‘liar sentences’’ and their ilk. But the phenomenon of semantic pathology also manifests a sibling symptom—an apparent indeterminacy—which, while not largely discussed (save for the occasional nod to ‘‘truthteller sentences’’), is just as pervasive as, and exactly parallels, the symptom of inconsistency. Moreover, certain ‘‘dual symptom’’ cases, which we call naysayers, exhibit both inconsistency and indeterminacy and also manifest a higher-order indeterminacy between them. In (...)
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  43. Future Contradictions.Jc Beall - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):547-557.
    A common and much-explored thought is ?ukasiewicz's idea that the future is ?indeterminate??i.e., ?gappy? with respect to some claims?and that such indeterminacy bleeds back into the present in the form of gappy ?future contingent? claims. What is uncommon, and to my knowledge unexplored, is the dual idea of an overdeterminate future?one which is ?glutty? with respect to some claims. While the direct dual, with future gluts bleeding back into the present, is worth noting, my central aim is simply to sketch (...)
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  44. Contradiction or Non-Contradiction? Hegel's Dialectic Between Brandom and Priest.Michela Bordignon - 2012 - Verifiche: Rivista Trimestrale di Scienze Umane 41 (1-3).
    The aim of the paper is to analyse Brandom’s account of Hegel’s conception of determinate negation and the role this structure plays in the dialectical process with respect to the problem of contradiction. After having shown both the merits and the limits of Brandom’s account, I will refer to Priest’s dialetheistic approach to contradiction as an alternative contemporary perspective from which it is possible to capture essential features of Hegel’s notion of contradiction, and I will test the equation of Hegel’s (...)
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  45. Paraconsistent Logics From a Philosophical Point of View.Diogo Dias - 2012 - Cognitio-Estudos 9 (2):139-148.
    This article begins with a general and abstract definition of logic and, particularly, of paraconsistent logics, to establish a common ground for the discussion. Briefly stating, these kinds of logics have the property of being non-explosive, that is, it is not possible to infer any conclusion from contradictory premises. Using these definitions, it is possible to analyze some of the philosophical aspects of paraconsistent logics, in particular, the relation between the notion of explosion and the law of non-contradiction, as well (...)
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  46. Pinocchio Beards the Barber.Peter Eldridge-Smith - 2012 - Analysis 72 (4):749-752.
    The Pinocchio paradox poses one dialetheia too many for semantic dialetheists (Eldridge-Smith 2011). However, Beall (2011) thinks that the Pinocchio scenario is merely an impossible story, like that of the village barber who shaves just those villagers who do not shave themselves. Meanwhile, Beall maintains that Liar paradoxes generate dialetheia. The Barber scenario is self-contradictory, yet the Pinocchio scenario requires a principle of truth for a contradiction. In this and other respects the Pinocchio paradox is a version of the Liar, (...)
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  47. Parallels Between Gaps and Gluts.Daniel Immerman - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):383-394.
    This paper compares two proposed solutions to the liar paradox, both of which involve revisions to classical semantics. The first, that of truth value gaps, denies that all sentences are true or false. The second, that of truth value gluts, asserts that some sentences are true and false. A natural question about these proposals is, ?Do they offer equally good (or bad) solutions, or is one better than the other?? Parsons 1990 suggested an answer to this question, arguing that for (...)
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  48. Dialetheism and the Graphic Liar.Greg Littmann - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (1):15-27.
    A Liar sentence is a sentence that, paradoxically, we cannot evaluate for truth in accordance with classical logic and semantics without arriving at a contradiction. For example, consider L If we assume that L is true, then given that what L says is ‘L is false,’ it follows that L is false. On the other hand, if we assume that L is false, then given that what L says is ‘L is false,’ it follows that L is true. Thus, L (...)
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  49. Moments of Change.Greg Littmann - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (1):29-44.
    There is a strong intuition that for a change to occur, there must be a moment at which the change is taking place. It will be demonstrated that there are no such moments of change, since no state the changing thing could be in at any moment would suffice to make that moment a moment of change. A moment in which the changing thing is simply in the state changed from or the state changed to cannot be the moment of (...)
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  50. “Omnis Determinatio Est Negatio” – Determination, Negation and Self-Negation in Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel.Yitzhak Y. Melamed - 2012 - In Eckart Forster & Yitzhak Y. Melamed (eds.), Spinoza and German Idealism. Cambridge University Press.
    Spinoza ’s letter of June 2, 1674 to his friend Jarig Jelles addresses several distinct and important issues in Spinoza ’s philosophy. It explains briefly the core of Spinoza ’s disagreement with Hobbes’ political theory, develops his innovative understanding of numbers, and elaborates on Spinoza ’s refusal to describe God as one or single. Then, toward the end of the letter, Spinoza writes: With regard to the statement that figure is a negation and not anything positive, it is obvious that (...)
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