Aristotle on the Firmness of the Principle of Non-Contradiction

Phronesis 49 (3):225-265 (2004)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In "Metaphysics" Gamma 3 Aristotle declares that the philosopher investigates things that are qua things that are and that he therefore should be able to state the firmest principles of everything. The firmest principle of all is identified as the principle of non-contradiction (PNC). The main focus of Gamma 3 is Aristotle's proof for this identification. This paper begins with remarks about Aristotle's notion of the firmness of a principle and then offers an analysis of the firmness proof for PNC. It focuses on some key assumptions of the proof and on the range and force of the proof. Aristotle closes Gamma 3 with the claim that PNC is ultimate in the sense that all other principles somehow rest on it. This, rather controversial, claim is given a defensible reading and shown to be central to the chapter's effort to establish PNC as the firmest principle of all. As such it completes the firmness proof and is not simply an appended remark

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,774

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
133 (#34,792)

6 months
4 (#1,635,958)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Michael Vernon Wedin
University of Chicago

References found in this work

Methods of logic.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1952 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Aristotle's Metaphysics. Aristotle - 1966 - Clarendon Press.
Methods of Logic.W. V. Quine - 1952 - Critica 15 (45):119-123.
Methods of Logic.P. L. Heath & Willard Van Orman Quine - 1955 - Philosophical Quarterly 5 (21):376.
Aristotle and Logical Theory.Jonathan Lear - 1980 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

View all 33 references / Add more references