Skilled activity and the causal theory of action

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):523-550 (2010)
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Skilled activity, such as shaving or dancing, differs in important ways from many of the stock examples that are employed by action theorists. Some critics of the causal theory of action contend that such a view founders on the problem of skilled activity. This paper examines how a causal theory can be extended to the case of skilled activity and defends the account from its critics.



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Randolph Clarke
Florida State University

Citations of this work

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