An argument against the causal theory of action explanation

It is widely held that belief explanations of action are a species of causal explanation. This paper argues against the causal construal of action explanation. It first defends the claim that unless beliefs are brain states, beliefs cannot causally explain behavior. Second, the paper argues against the view that beliefs are brain states. It follows from these claims that beliefs do not causally explain behavior. An alternative account is then proposed, according to which action explanation is teleological rather than causal, and the paper closes by suggesting that teleological account makes sense of and supports the autonomy of common sense psychology
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205  
DOI 10.2307/2653428
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Idealism and the Philosophy of Mind.Giuseppina D'Oro - 2005 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 48 (5):395-412.
Connectionism and the Causal Theory of Action Explanation.Scott R. Sehon - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (4):511-532.

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