Minimal Truth Is Realist Truth [Book Review]

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):869-875 (1996)
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00318205

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10.2307/2108287

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Minimal Truth Is Realist Truth (Reviewed work: Crispin Wright's Truth and Objectivity).James Van Cleve - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):869-875.
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Citations of this work

Simplifying alethic pluralism.Douglas Edwards - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):28-48.
On Wright's argument against deflationism.Alexander Miller - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):527-531.
Why Correspondence Truth Will Not Go Away.Gerald Vision - 1997 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (1):104-131.

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