David Coady
University of Tasmania
Rumours are widely held to be both epistemically and morally suspect. This article concentrates on the epistemic arguments against rumours, since the moral arguments tend to be dependent on them. I conclude that the usual arguments against believing rumours and engaging in rumour-mongering are extremely weak. I compare the epistemic status of rumours to the epistemic status of some rival methods of acquiring information, and conclude that rumours are an important and irreplaceable source of justified belief and knowledge
Keywords Applied Philosophy  General Interest
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Reprint years 2012
ISBN(s) 0739-098X
DOI 10.5840/ijap20062012
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When Experts Disagree.David Coady - 2006 - Episteme 3 (1-2):68-79.
When Experts Disagree.David Coady - 2006 - Episteme 3 (1-2):68-79.

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