Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):93 - 103 (1971)

Abstract
The account of belief adumbrated by Ryle in The Concept of Mind is, I think, a very tempting one despite its relative vagueness. According to this account, a belief that such and such is the case is a disposition of a certain kind. More specifically, it is a tendency or a propensity to behave and to react in more or less definite ways under certain circumstances. Thus “to believe that the ice is dangerously thin,” Ryle writes, “is to be unhesitant in telling oneself and others that it is thin, in acquiescing in other people's assertions to that effect, in objecting to statements to the contrary, in drawing consequences from the original proposition,. and so forth.” Moreover, he continues, “it is also to be prone to skate warily, to shudder, to dwell in imagination on possible disasters and to warn other skaters.” In short, to believe that p is to have “a propensity not only to make certain theoretical moves but also to make certain executive and imaginative moves, as well as to have certain feelings.”
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DOI 10.1080/00455091.1971.10716011
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophical investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein & G. E. M. Anscombe - 1953 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 161:124-124.
The Analysis of Mind.J. S. Mackenzie - 1921 - International Journal of Ethics 32 (2):212-215.
Persons and Psychological Concepts.Robert C. Coburn - 1967 - American Philosophical Quarterly 4 (3):208-221.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
Philosophical Investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein & G. E. M. Anscombe - 1953 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 4 (15):258-260.

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