Dialectica 60 (3):307-319 (2006)

Authors
Jonathan Cohen
University of California, San Diego
Abstract
An adequate ontology of color must face the empirical facts about per- ceptual variation. In this paper I begin by reviewing a range of data about perceptual variation, and showing how they tell against color physicalism and motivate color relationalism. Next I consider a series of objections to the argument from perceptual variation, and argue that they are un- persuasive. My conclusion will be that the argument remains a powerful obstacle for color physicalism, and a powerful reason to believe in color relationalism instead
Keywords REALISM   SCIENCE   VISION
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2006.01057.x
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References found in this work BETA

How to Speak of the Colors.Mark Johnston - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.
Color Realism and Color Science.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21.

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Citations of this work BETA

Truest Blue.A. Byrne & D. R. Hilbert - 2007 - Analysis 67 (1):87-92.
A Puzzle About Colors.Martine Nida-Rumelin - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (3):321-336.

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