Are There Ultimately Founded Propositions?

Universitas Philosophica 27 (54):163-177 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Can we find propositions that cannot rationally be denied in any possible world without assuming the existence of that same proposition, and so involving ourselves in a contradiction? In other words, can we find transworld propositions needing no further foundation or justification? Basically, three differing positions can be imagined: firstly, a relativist position, according to which ultimately founded propositions are impossible; secondly, a meta-relativist position, according to which ultimately founded propositions are possible but unnecessary; and thirdly, an absolute position, according to which such propositions are necessary. In this short essay I show that under the premise of modal logic S5 with constant domain there are ultimately founded propositions and that their existence is even necessary, and I will give some reasons for the superiority of S5 over other logics.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Logic of Contingent Existence.Daniel Michael Kervick - 1997 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
Propositions, Sets, and Worlds.Dale Jacquette - 2006 - Studia Logica 82 (3):337-343.
Is evidence non-inferential?Alexander Bird - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):252–265.
8 Valued Non-Deterministic Semantics for Modal Logics.Pawel Pawlowski & Daniel Skurt - 2024 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 53 (2):351-371.
On Basic Knowledge without Justification.Paul K. Moser - 1985 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15 (2):305 - 310.
On Basic Knowledge Without Justification.Paul K. Moser - 1985 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15 (2):305-310.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-10-14

Downloads
828 (#1,474)

6 months
88 (#188,209)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Gregor Damschen
University of Oldenburg

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Does conceivability entail possibility.David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 145--200.
The Nature of Necessity.Alvin Plantinga - 1974 - Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.
Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.
A New Introduction to Modal Logic.M. J. Cresswell & G. E. Hughes - 1996 - New York: Routledge. Edited by M. J. Cresswell.

View all 18 references / Add more references