Heidegger and the Thorny Issue of (Re)configuring Facticity

The purpose of this article is twofold. It first seeks to prove that the notion of facticity in Heidegger’s work saw a major change after Being and Time. While several studies did deal with facticity as it appeared before the magnus opus and show the influence it had on the latter’s development, hardly any have dealt with what happens to facticity after Sein und Zeit. This is mostly because facticity, as it imploded, took on different names which fall under the heading of ground-attunements. Secondly, I will show the ambivalent character of this new facticity, where many essential notions, such as thrownness, truth, attunement and guilt, shifted meanings, sometimes almost imperceptibly or surreptitiously. I will show that this ambivalence comes from the fact that the shift in question allowed for an opening of facticity while at the same time bringing in restrictive limits, and thus a closing-off of certain essential issues. This has left several adumbrated questions, such as responsibility, in abeyance.