Why Post-Truth Cannot Be Our Epistemological Compass

Social Epistemology 37 (2):164-176 (2023)
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Abstract

This paper tackles some of the arguments Steve Fuller – arguably the best advocate of post-truth currently on the scene – put forward to show that, correctly understood, post-truth is the best conceptual tool to get a clear picture not only of what is happening in our societies today, but also of what has happened throughout the secular history of Western culture. The implicit assumption is that post-truth represents a reliable ‘epistemological compass’ – that is, a notion (or a set of notions) for proper orientation in both cultural and physical environments. The aim of the paper is to show that Fuller’s arguments do not work, because an epistemological compass can only be centered on a plausible notion of objectivity, and – it will be contended – this is exactly what Fuller lacks. Accordingly, it will be stressed how the upshot of his theses is the opposite of what he presumes it to be and, moreover, that his theses prove lethal to his own position.

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Massimo Dell'Utri
Università Di Sassari

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References found in this work

The View from Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Behaviorism 15 (1):73-82.
Social constructionism and climate science denial.Sven Ove Hansson - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (3):1-27.
Freedom, cruelty, and truth: Rorty versus Orwell.James Conant - 2000 - In Robert Brandom (ed.), Rorty and His Critics. Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 268--342.

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