Synthese 191 (1):1-17 (2014)

Authors
Jeroen De Ridder
VU University Amsterdam
Abstract
I argue that scientific knowledge is collective knowledge, in a sense to be specified and defended. I first consider some existing proposals for construing collective knowledge and argue that they are unsatisfactory, at least for scientific knowledge as we encounter it in actual scientific practice. Then I introduce an alternative conception of collective knowledge, on which knowledge is collective if there is a strong form of mutual epistemic dependence among scientists, which makes it so that satisfaction of the justification condition on knowledge ineliminably requires a collective. Next, I show how features of contemporary science support the conclusion that scientific knowledge is collective knowledge in this sense. Finally, I consider implications of my proposal and defend it against objections
Keywords Social epistemology  Scientific knowledge  Collective knowledge  Epistemic dependence  Testimony  Justification
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Reprint years 2014
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-013-0283-3
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
Knowledge in a Social World.Alvin I. Goldman - 1999 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Extended Knowledge-How.J. Adam Carter & Bolesław Czarnecki - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (2):259-273.
Values in Science: The Case of Scientific Collaboration.Kristina Rolin - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (2):157-177.
Inevitability, Contingency, and Epistemic Humility.Ian James Kidd - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 55:12-19.

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