50 found
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  1.  98
    Learning From Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge.Jennifer Lackey - 2008 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Testimony is an invaluable source of knowledge. We rely on the reports of those around us for everything from the ingredients in our food and medicine to the identity of our family members. Recent years have seen an explosion of interest in the epistemology of testimony. Despite the multitude of views offered, a single thesis is nearly universally accepted: testimonial knowledge is acquired through the process of transmission from speaker to hearer. In this book, Jennifer Lackey shows that this thesis (...)
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  2. Norms of Assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.
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  3. Why We Don't Deserve Credit for Everything We Know.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):345--361.
    A view of knowledge—what I call the Deserving Credit View of Knowledge(DCVK)—found in much of the recent epistemological literature, particularly among so-called virtue epistemologists, centres around the thesis that knowledge is something for which a subject deserves credit. Indeed, this is said to be the central difference between those true beliefs that qualify as knowledge and those that are true merely by luck—the former, unlike the latter, are achievements of the subject and are thereby creditable to her. Moreover, it is (...)
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  4. What Luck is Not.Jennifer Lackey - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):255 – 267.
    In this paper, I critically examine the two dominant views of the concept of luck in the current literature: lack of control accounts and modal accounts. In particular, I argue that the conditions proposed by such views—that is, a lack of control and the absence of counterfactual robustness—are neither necessary nor sufficient for an event's being lucky. Hence, I conclude that the two main accounts in the current literature both fail to capture what is distinctive of, and central to, the (...)
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  5. The Epistemology of Testimony.Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.) - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
    Testimony is a crucial source of knowledge: we are to a large extent reliant upon what others tell us. It has been the subject of much recent interest in epistemology, and this volume collects twelve original essays on the topic by some of the world's leading philosophers. It will be the starting point for future research in this fertile field. Contributors include Robert Audi, C. A. J. Coady, Elizabeth Fricker, Richard Fumerton, Sanford C. Goldberg, Peter Graham, Jennifer Lackey, Keith Lehrer, (...)
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  6. Knowledge and Credit.Jennifer Lackey - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 142 (1):27 - 42.
    A widely accepted view in recent work in epistemology is that knowledge is a cognitive achievement that is properly creditable to those subjects who possess it. More precisely, according to the Credit View of Knowledge, if S knows that p, then S deserves credit for truly believing that p. In spite of its intuitive appeal and explanatory power, I have elsewhere argued that the Credit View is false. Various responses have been offered to my argument and I here consider each (...)
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  7.  55
    What Is Justified Group Belief?Jennifer Lackey - 2016 - Philosophical Review 125 (3):341-396.
    This essay raises new objections to the two dominant approaches to understanding the justification of group beliefs—inflationary views, where groups are treated as entities that can float freely from the epistemic status of their members’ beliefs, and deflationary views, where justified group belief is understood as nothing more than the aggregation of the justified beliefs of the group's members. If this essay is right, we need to look in an altogether different place for an adequate account of justified group belief. (...)
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  8. Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission.Jennifer Lackey - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (197):471-490.
    We often talk about knowledge being transmitted via testimony. This suggests a picture of testimony with striking similarities to memory. For instance, it is often assumed that neither is a generative source of knowledge: while the former transmits knowledge from one speaker to another, the latter preserves beliefs from one time to another. These considerations give rise to a stronger and a weaker thesis regarding the transmission of testimonial knowledge. The stronger thesis is that each speaker in a chain of (...)
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  9.  82
    Memory as a Generative Epistemic Source.Jennifer Lackey - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):636–658.
    It is widely assumed that memory has only the capacity to preserve epistemic features that have been generated by other sources. Specifically, if S knows (justifiedly believes/rationally believes) that p via memory at T2, then it is argued that (i) S must have known (justifiedly believed/rationally believed) that p when it was originally acquired at Tl, and (ii) S must have acquired knowledge that p (justification with respect to p/rationality with respect to p) at Tl via a non-memorial source. Thus, (...)
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  10. Assertion and Expertise.Jennifer Lackey - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):509-517.
  11. Assertion and Isolated Second-Hand Knowledge.Jennifer Lackey - 2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 251--276.
  12.  12
    Group Assertion.Jennifer Lackey - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.
    In this paper, I provide the framework for an account of group assertion. On my view, there are two kinds of group assertion, coordinated and authority-based, with authority-based group assertion being the core notion. I argue against a deflationary view, according to which a group’s asserting is understood in terms of individual assertions, by showing that a group can assert a proposition even when no individual does. Instead, I argue on behalf of an inflationary view, according to which it is (...)
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  13. A Justificationist View of Disagreement's Epistemic Significance.Jennifer Lackey - 2008 - In Alan Millar Adrian Haddock & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 145-154.
    The question that will be the focus of this paper is this: what is the significance of disagreement between those who are epistemic peers? There are two answers to this question found in the recent literature. On the one hand, there are those who hold that one can continue to rationally believe that p despite the fact that one’s epistemic peer explicitly believes that not-p. I shall call those who hold this view nonconformists. In contrast, there are those who hold (...)
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  14.  61
    A Minimal Expression of Non–Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony.Jennifer Lackey - 2003 - Noûs 37 (4):706–723.
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  15. What Should We Do When We Disagree?Jennifer Lackey - 2008 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 274-93.
    You and I have been colleagues for ten years, during which we have tirelessly discussed the reasons both for and against the existence of God. There is no argument or piece of evidence bearing directly on this question that one of us is aware of that the other is not—we are, then, evidential equals1 relative to the topic of God’s existence.2 There is also no cognitive virtue or capacity, or cognitive vice or incapacity, that one of us possesses that the (...)
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  16. The Nature of Testimony.Jennifer Lackey - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2):177–197.
    I discuss several views of the nature of testimony and show how each proposal has importantly different problems. I then offer a diagnosis of the widespread disagreement regarding this topic; specifically, I argue that our concept of testimony has two different aspects to it. Inadequate views of testimony, I claim, result either from collapsing these two aspects into a single account or from a failure to recognize one of them. Finally, I develop an alternative view of testimony that captures both (...)
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  17.  63
    Pritchard's Epistemic Luck. [REVIEW]Jennifer Lackey - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):284–289.
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  18. Learning From Words.Jennifer Lackey - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):77–101.
    While much of our knowledge relies on testimony or the words of others, until recently few philosophers had much to say about the nature of testimony or how we learn from another's words, but testimony has now become a popular topic. Jennifer Lackey's Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge is a useful and intelligent guide, a well informed and appreciative but critical and provocative commentary on a large and growing body of literature.According to Lackey, most of the (...)
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  19.  80
    Acting on Knowledge.Jennifer Lackey - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):361-382.
  20.  61
    Socially Extended Knowledge.Jennifer Lackey - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):282-298.
  21.  8
    Why We Don’T Deserve Credit for Everything We Know.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):345-361.
    A view of knowledge—what I call the "Deserving Credit View of Knowledge" —found in much of the recent epistemological literature, particularly among so-called virtue epistemologists, centres around the thesis that knowledge is something for which a subject deserves credit. Indeed, this is said to be the central difference between those true beliefs that qualify as knowledge and those that are true merely by luck—the former, unlike the latter, are achievements of the subject and are thereby creditable to her. Moreover, it (...)
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  22.  20
    Why Numbers Matter.Jennifer Lackey - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 243.
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  23.  62
    Testimony and the Infant/Child Objection.Jennifer Lackey - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (2):163-190.
    One of the central problems afflicting reductionism in the epistemology of testimony is the apparent fact that infants and small children are not cognitively capable of having the inductively based positive reasons required by this view. Since non-reductionism does not impose a requirement of this sort, it is thought to avoid this problem and is therefore taken to have a significant advantage over reductionism. In this paper, however, I argue that if this objection undermines reductionism, then a variant of it (...)
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  24. Knowing From Testimony.Jennifer Lackey - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (5):432–448.
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  25. Group Knowledge Attributions.Jennifer Lackey - unknown -
    A view growing in popularity in the current philosophical literature is that the purpose of knowledge attributions is to identify or flag good informants. Such a thesis has its origin in the work of Bernard Williams and Edward Craig. Williams, for instance, claims that the central point of the concept of knowledge is “to find somebody who is a source of reliable information about something” (1973, p.
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  26. It Takes Two to Tango: Beyond Reductionism and Non-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony.Jennifer Lackey - 2006 - In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford University Press. pp. 160--89.
     
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  27.  55
    Why Memory Really is a Generative Epistemic Source: A Reply to Senor.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):209–219.
  28. Testimony: Acquiring Knowledge From Others.Jennifer Lackey - 2010 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford University Press.
    Virtually everything we know depends in some way or other on the testimony of others—what we eat, how things work, where we go, even who we are. We do not, after all, perceive firsthand the preparation of the ingredients in many of our meals, or the construction of the devices we use to get around the world, or the layout of our planet, or our own births and familial histories. These are all things we are told. Indeed, subtracting from our (...)
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  29. New Essays on Disagreement.Jennifer Lackey (ed.) - 2012 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  30. What's the Rational Response to Everyday Disagreements?Jennifer Lackey - 2012 - The Philosophers' Magazine 59 (59):101-106.
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  31. Testimonial Knowledge.Jennifer Lackey - unknown -
    Testimony is responsible, either directly or indirectly, for much of what we know, not only about the world around us but also about who we are. Despite its relative historical neglect, recent work in epistemology has seen a growing recognition of the importance and scope of testimonial knowledge. Most of this work has focused on two central questions, which will be the main topics of this article. First, is testimonial knowledge necessarily acquired through transmission from speaker to hearer, or can (...)
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  32.  51
    Reliability and Knowledge in the Epistemology of Testimony.Jennifer Lackey - 2015 - Episteme 12 (2):203-208.
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  33. 1. Reductionism.Jennifer Lackey - 2006 - In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford University Press. pp. 160.
     
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  34.  25
    Acquiring Knowledge From Others.Jennifer Lackey - forthcoming - Social Epistemology: Essential Readings.
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  35.  36
    Introduction: Perspectives on Testimony.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Episteme 4 (3):233-237.
    Almost everything we know depends in some way on testimony. Without the ability to learn from others, it would be virtually impossible for any individual person to know much beyond what has come within the scope of her immediate perceptual environment. The fruits of science, history, geography – all of these would be beyond our grasp, as would much of what we know about ourselves. We do not, after all, perceive that we belong to one family rather than to another (...)
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  36.  40
    Review of Michael DePaul (Ed.), Linda Zagzebski (Ed.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology[REVIEW]Jennifer Lackey - 2004 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (8).
    While there is a vast amount of writing on the concept of a virtue and its role in various areas of philosophy, this literature is fairly fragmented, with historians, ethicists, and epistemologists rarely engaged in direction conversation with one another. In light of this, Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology is a most welcome collection of essays in which virtue epistemologists and virtue ethicists—including ethicists grounded in the history of philosophy—for the first time take up various issues in consultation (...)
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  37.  23
    Knowledge by Agreement.Jennifer Lackey - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):235-237.
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  38.  14
    The Virtues of Testimony.Jennifer Lackey - 2013 - In John Turri (ed.), Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa. Springer. pp. 193--204.
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  39.  28
    Explanation and Mental Causation.Jennifer Lackey - 2002 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):375-393.
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  40.  7
    Review: Pritchard's Epistemic Luck. [REVIEW]Jennifer Lackey - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):284 - 289.
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  41. The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays.David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.) - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
    This is a collective study of the epistemic significance of disagreement: twelve contributors explore rival responses to the problems that it raises for philosophy.
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  42. A Justificationist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic Significance.Jennifer Lackey - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 53:145-154.
    The question that will be the focus of this paper is this: what is the significance of disagreement between those who are epistemic peers? There are two answers to this question found in the recent literature. On the one hand, there are those who hold that one can continue to rationally believe that p despite the fact that one’s epistemic peer explicitly believes that not-p. I shall call those who hold this view nonconformists. In contrast, there are those who hold (...)
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  43. An OUP Volume on Disagreement.Jennifer Lackey & David Christensen (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.
  44. Explanation and Mental Causation.Jennifer Lackey - 2002 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):375-393.
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  45. Introduction: Perspectives on Testimony.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 4 (3):233-237.
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  46. Learning From Words.Jennifer Lackey - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):77-101.
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  47. Memory as a Generative Epistemic Source.Jennifer Lackey - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):636-658.
    It is widely assumed that memory has only the capacity to preserve epistemic features that have been generated by other sources. Specifically, if S knows that p via memory at T2, then it is argued that S must have known that p when it was originally acquired at TI, and S must have acquired knowledge that p at T1 via a non-memorial source. Thus, according to this view, memory cannot make an unknown proposition known, an unjustified belief justified, or an (...)
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  48. Why Memory Really Is a Generative Epistemic Source: A Reply to Senor.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):209-219.
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  49. What’s the Rational Response to Everyday Disagreements?Jennifer Lackey - 2012 - The Philosophers' Magazine 59:101-106.
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  50. Learning From Words.Jennifer Lackey - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):572-574.
    While much of our knowledge relies on testimony or the words of others, until recently few philosophers had much to say about the nature of testimony or how we learn from another's words, but testimony has now become a popular topic. Jennifer Lackey's Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge is a useful and intelligent guide, a well informed and appreciative but critical and provocative commentary on a large and growing body of literature.According to Lackey, most of the (...)
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