Non-objective Truths: Comments on Kölbel's Criterion for Objectivity
Abstract
I enjoyed reading Max Kölbel's deep and interesting paper. I have learned a lot about points and arguments I am not entirely familiar with, and it has helped me to articulate better my own intuitions about the subject. In particular I share with him the intuition I would now articulate as follows: there are contents p of utterances of declarative sentences like, for instance, 'Licorice is tasty', such that it is not an objective matter whether p. This is the claim that there are non-objective truths and falsehoods, and it is a plain consequence of global truth-evaluability, i.e. the view according to which the content of utterances of all declarative sentences are truth-evaluable. For in this case one, unless radical objectivist, has to accept that for some such contents it is not an objective matter if they are true nor it is an objective matter if they are false. And Kölbel has presented some reasons for such global truth-evaluability: philosophical and linguistic semantics presupposes it, classical logical validity presupposes it, and we do in fact attribute truth to contents of utterances of declarative sentences of any sort.