Two types of theories: The impact of Churchland's perceptual plasticity

Philosophical Psychology 8 (1):25-33 (1995)
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Abstract

In this paper I argue that because Churchland does not adequately address the distinction between high-level cognitive theories and low-level embodied theories, Churchland's claims for theory-laden perception lose their epistemological significance. I propose that Churchland and others debating the theory-ladenness of perception should distinguish carefully between two main ways in which perception is plastic: through modifying our high-level theories directly and through modifying our low-level theories using training experiences. This will require them to attend to two very different types of constraints on the modification of our perceptions.

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Peggy DesAutels
University of Dayton