Philosophical Psychology 8 (1):25-33 (1995)
In this paper I argue that because Churchland does not adequately address the distinction between high-level cognitive theories and low-level embodied theories, Churchland's claims for theory-laden perception lose their epistemological significance. I propose that Churchland and others debating the theory-ladenness of perception should distinguish carefully between two main ways in which perception is plastic: through modifying our high-level theories directly and through modifying our low-level theories using training experiences. This will require them to attend to two very different types of constraints on the modification of our perceptions.
|Keywords||Cognition Metaphysics Neutrality Perception Psychology Science Churchland, P|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science.Paul M. Churchland - 1989 - MIT Press.
Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind.Paul M. Churchland - 1979 - Cambridge University Press.
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Psychologies of Moral Perceivers.Peggy Desautels - 1998 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 22 (1):266-280.
Theory, Observation, and the Role of Scientific Understanding in the Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature.Glenn Parsons - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):165-186.
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