Two types of theories: The impact of Churchland's perceptual plasticity

Philosophical Psychology 8 (1):25-33 (1995)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper I argue that because Churchland does not adequately address the distinction between high-level cognitive theories and low-level embodied theories, Churchland's claims for theory-laden perception lose their epistemological significance. I propose that Churchland and others debating the theory-ladenness of perception should distinguish carefully between two main ways in which perception is plastic: through modifying our high-level theories directly and through modifying our low-level theories using training experiences. This will require them to attend to two very different types of constraints on the modification of our perceptions.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,174

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

On a Model for Psycho-Neural Coevolution.Bernard W. Kobes - 1991 - Behavior and Philosophy 19 (2):1-17.
Intertheoretic Relations and the Future of Psychology.Robert N. McCauley - 1986 - Philosophy of Science 53 (June):179-99.
The End of Plasticity.Herman Philipse - 1997 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):291-306.
The Neurobiology of Observation.Daniel Gilman - 1991 - Philosophy of Science 58 (3):496-502.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
31 (#373,211)

6 months
1 (#413,740)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?