On a Generality Condition in Proof‐Theoretic Semantics

Theoria 83 (4):394-418 (2017)
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Abstract

In the recent literature on proof-theoretic semantics, there is mention of a generality condition on defining rules. According to this condition, the schematic formulation of the defining rules must be maximally general, in the sense that no restrictions should be placed on the contexts of these rules. In particular, context variables must always be present in the schematic rules and they should range over arbitrary collections of formulae. I argue against imposing such a condition, by showing that it has undesirable results and that it is ill-supported by the arguments brought in its favour.

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Bogdan Dicher
University of Witwatersrand

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