Marc Slors on personal identity

Philosophical Explorations 2 (2):143 – 149 (1999)
Theories of personal identity purport to specify truth conditions for sentences of the form 'x-at-ti is the same person as y-at-tj. Most philosophers nowadays agree that such truth conditions are to be stated in terms of psychological continuity. However; opinions vary as to how the notion of psychological continuity is to be understood. In a recent contribution to this journal, Slors offers an account in which psychological continuity is spelled out in terms of narrative connectedness between mental states.The present paper argues that Slors' theory either is no theory of personal identity at all or is too weak.Towards the end of the paper, it is indicated how the problem uncovered for Slors' theory may be avoided.
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DOI 10.1080/13869799908520974
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Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
The Nature of Necessity.Alvin Plantinga - 1974 - Clarendon Press.
The Folly of Trying to Define Truth.Donald Davidson - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (6):263-278.
Two Conceptions of Psychological Continuity.Marc Slors - 1998 - Philosophical Explorations 1 (1):61 – 80.
Can the World Help Us in Fixing the Reference of Natural Kind Terms?Igor Douven & Jaap Van Brakel - 1998 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 29 (1):59 - 70.

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