Abstract

G. W. F. Hegel is stuck between a rock and a hard place in the history of moral philosophy. On one hand, he is frequently regarded as an infamous critic of Kantian moral individualism. From the standpoint of Kierkegaard’s Socratic revival, Hegel is seen as ignoring or even suppressing the individual in favor of a ‘systematic’ form of philosophy. This paper addresses both criticisms by reconstructing Hegel’s unique contribution to the history of moral philosophy. Refusing to reduce Hegel to a foil for either Kant or Kierkegaard reveals his own inheritance of a Socratic ethic. I argue that Hegel revives a long-suppressed form of moral and practical philosophy: the Bildung of one’s self-understanding that involves both self-knowledge and self-transformation. Understanding the way in which Hegel resurrects and reinterprets this conception of moral philosophy requires that one pay attention to the close connection between his systematic method and his unique version of skepticism.