In Lisa Rasmussen (ed.), Ethics Expertise: History, Contemporary Perspectives, and Applications. Springer. pp. 89–102 (2005)
According to G. E. Moore, moral expertise requires abilities of several kinds: the ability to factor judgments of right and wrong into (a) judgments of good and bad and (b) judgments of cause and effect, (2) the ability to use intuition to make the requisite judgments of good and bad, and (3) the ability to use empirical investigation to make the requisite judgments of cause and effect. Moore’s conception of moral expertise is thus extremely demanding, but he supplements it with some very simple practical guidance.
|Keywords||Ethics Expertise G. E. Moore|
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