Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (4):537 - 562 (2003)

Authors
Jeremy Fantl
University of Calgary
Abstract
Modest Infinitism Jeremy Fantl Abstract Infinitism, a theory of justification most recently developed and defended by Peter Klein, is the view that justification is a matter of having an infinite series of non-repeating reasons for a proposition. I argue that infinitism is preferable to other theories (like foundationalism) in that only infinitism can plausibly account for two important features of justification: 1) that it admits of degrees and 2) that a concept of complete justification makes sense.
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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ISBN(s) 0045-5091
DOI 10.1080/00455091.2003.10716554
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References found in this work BETA

Persons, Character, and Morality.Bernard Williams - 1976 - In James Rachels (ed.), Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980. Cambridge University Press.
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Philosophy 58 (223):118-121.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Unity of Grounding.Selim Berker - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):729-777.
Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification.Richard Fumerton - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
On the Regress Argument for Infinitism.John Turri - 2009 - Synthese 166 (1):157 - 163.

View all 23 citations / Add more citations

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