On a Purported Principle of Practical Reason

Abstract
A number of philosophers are attracted to the Principle of the Priority of Belief (or PPB) in practical matters. PPB has two parts: (1) it is a principle of practical reason to adjust your desires in accordance with your evaluative beliefs and (2) you should not adjust your evaluative beliefs in accordance with your desires. The central claim of this principle is that beliefs rightly govern desires and that desires have no authority over beliefs. This paper advances conceptual and empiricalarguments against accepting PPB. In the place of PPB, we should adopt a principle that advises agents to eliminate explicit tension between evaluative beliefs and desires without privileging either group. Call this the Principle of Evaluative Coherence (PEC). PEC maintains that some change must be made and that it can be rational to side with the considerations favored by desire
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 1053-8364
DOI 10.5840/jpr_2008_14
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 29,841
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
The Principle of Charity, Transcendentalism and Relativism.María Rosario Hernández Borges - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:69-75.
Humean Instrumentalism and the Motivational Capacity of Reason.Patrick Yarnell - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Research 27:499-509.
The Motivational Role of Belief.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (2):219 - 246.
On Desires and Practical Reasons.John J. Tilley - 2004 - Acta Analytica 19 (32):5-18.
Formal Principles and the Form of a Law.Andrews Reath - 2010 - In Andrews Reath & Jens Timmermann (eds.), Kant's Critique of Practical Reason: A Critical Guide. Cambridge University Press.
The Fundamental Principle of Practical Reasoning.Ralph Wedgwood - 1998 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6 (2):189 – 209.
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
75 ( #75,980 of 2,210,292 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #225,618 of 2,210,292 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature