Can Multiple Realisation be Explained?

Philosophy 96 (1):27-48 (2021)
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Abstract

Multiple realisation prompts the question: how is it that multiple systems all exhibit the same phenomena despite their different underlying properties? In this paper I develop a framework for addressing that question and argue that multiple realisation can be reductively explained. I illustrate this position by applying the framework to a simple example – the multiple realisation of electrical conductivity. I defend my account by addressing potential objections:contra Polger and Shapiro, Batterman, and Sober, I claim that multiple realisation is commonplace, that it can be reductively explained, but that it requires asui generisreductive explanatory strategy.

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Alexander Franklin
King's College London

Citations of this work

Some reflections on Robert Batterman's a middle way.James Woodward - 2024 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 106 (C):21-30.

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References found in this work

Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Princeton University Press.
Special sciences.Jerry A. Fodor - 1974 - Synthese 28 (2):97-115.
Physicalism, or Something near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):306-310.
Saving the phenomena.James Bogen & James Woodward - 1988 - Philosophical Review 97 (3):303-352.

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