Une analyse dichotomique du paradoxe de l’examen-surprise

Philosophiques 32 (2):399-421 (2005)
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Abstract

This paper proposes a new framework to solve the surprise examination paradox. I survey preliminary the main contributions to the literature related to the paradox. I introduce then a distinction between a monist and a dichotomic analysis of the paradox. With the help of a matrix notation, I also present a dichotomy that leads to distinguish two basically and structurally different notions of surprise, which are respectively based on a conjoint and a disjoint structure. I describe then how Quine’s solution applies to the version of the paradox corresponding to the conjoint structure. Lastly, I expose a solution to the paradox based on the disjoint structure.

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References found in this work

A paradox regained.D. Kaplan & R. Montague - 1960 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 1 (3):79-90.
On a so-called paradox.W. V. Quine - 1953 - Mind 62 (245):65-67.
The surprise examination in modal logic.Robert Binkley - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (5):127-136.
Pragmatic paradoxes.D. J. O'Connor - 1948 - Mind 57 (227):358-359.

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