This paper proposes a concept of "valid reasoning" that will apply univocally to reasoned judgment (inference), Reasoned decision (choice), And reasoned withholding of judgment and decision. "reasoning" is taken to include all these; "validity" of reasoning is defined in terms of the "ideally rational mind", Which is in turn defined by a modal logic of judging and deciding. The definition is defended by relating it to another ideal, That of the socratically omniscient and stoically omniscient sage, Who is defined by (...) a modal logic of knowing and doing. In the course of this I distinguish between the vehicle and the description of a mental act, Deny that reasoning is a transition, Analyze doing as causing to be, And maintain that, Since doing stands to deciding as knowing stands to judging, Reasoned decision is genuinely practical reasoning. (shrink)
To find the place of Argumentation (argumentation theory) in education one must sort out its relationship to Logic. The key point is that the two stand in different relations to reasoning. Logic is the normative study of reasoning, and provides the standards for correct reasoning. Argumentation studies the activity of arguing, and is related to reasoning only in that arguing involves the attempt to get an audience to reason in a certain way; correctness is not essential. Reasoning is here understood (...) as the process of organizing one's thoughts into a structure here called a reckoning. This may be done privately by an individual, or several people may collaborate on a reasoning project, in which case there occurs the social activity of dialogue. Confusion between dialogue and arguing is a source of confusion between Logic and Argumentation. Reasoning and dialogue on the one hand, and arguing on the other, are both worthwhile, and education in Logic and Argumentation can help people to do them better. But the educating should be done in a way that maintains the distinction between them. (shrink)
The task of giving a philosophical account of moral judgements—both of the language used to express such judgements and of what must be in the mind and surrounding circumstances of the agent who makes them—has been high on the agenda of ethical theory for some time. David Copp proposes to take care of that item in this book. The result is a theory which, at the analytic level, endorses cognitivism, realism, naturalism, relativism, and motivational externalism. At the normative level, it (...) is perhaps closest to rule utilitarianism, though it does not strictly conform to any of the usual definitions. The book moves always at the level of theory, without taking up applications to real moral issues, though it is easy to see how there might be such applications. (shrink)
The task of giving a philosophical account of moral judgements—both of the language used to express such judgements and of what must be in the mind and surrounding circumstances of the agent who makes them—has been high on the agenda of ethical theory for some time. David Copp proposes to take care of that item in this book. The result is a theory which, at the analytic level, endorses cognitivism, realism, naturalism, relativism, and motivational externalism. At the normative level, it (...) is perhaps closest to rule utilitarianism, though it does not strictly conform to any of the usual definitions. The book moves always at the level of theory, without taking up applications to real moral issues, though it is easy to see how there might be such applications. (shrink)