Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (4):1047-1054 (2019)

Authors
Matthew Frise
Santa Clara University
Abstract
Process reliabilism is a theory about ex post justification, the justification of a doxastic attitude one has, such as belief. It says roughly that a justified belief is a belief formed by a reliable process. It is not a theory about ex ante justification, one’s justification for having a particular attitude toward a proposition, an attitude one might lack. But many reliabilists supplement their theory such that it explains ex ante justification in terms of reliable processes. In this paper I argue that the main way reliabilists supplement their theory fails. In the absence of an alternative, reliabilism does not account for ex ante justification.
Keywords Process reliabilism  Ex ante justification  Ex post justification  Propositional justification  Doxastic justification  Ex ante problem  Alvin Goldman
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DOI 10.1111/papq.12289
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References found in this work BETA

The Reliability Problem for Reliabilism.Matthew Frise - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (4):923-945.
Two Legacies of Goldman’s Epistemology.Ram Neta - 2017 - Philosophical Topics 45 (1):121-136.
Doxastic Justification is Fundamental.Hilary Kornblinth - 2017 - Philosophical Topics 45 (1):63-80.
Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Behaviorism 17 (2):161-164.

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