Pointers to truth

Journal of Philosophy 89 (5):223-261 (1992)
Abstract
If we try to evaluate the sentence on line 1 we ¯nd ourselves going in an unending cycle. For this reason alone we may conclude that the sentence is not true. Moreover we are driven to this conclusion by an elementary argument: If the sentence is true then what it asserts is true, but what it asserts is that the sentence on line 1 is not true. Consequently the sentence on line 1 is not true. But when we write this true conclusion on line 2 we ¯nd ourselves repeating the very same sentence. It seems that we are unable to deny the truth of the sentence on line 1 without asserting it at the same time.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy
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ISBN(s) 0022-362X
DOI jphil199289534
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Conditionals in Theories of Truth.Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):27-63.
Truth, Paradox, and Ineffable Propositions.James R. Shaw - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):64-104.
Deflationary Truth and the Liar.Keith Simmons - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (5):455-488.

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