Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):71-72 (1998)

Tamar Gendler
Yale University
Millikan contrasts her substance-based view of concepts with “descriptionism” according to which description determines what falls under a concept. Focusing on her discussion of the role of language in the acquisition of concepts, I argue that descriptions cannot be separated from perception in the ways Millikan's view requires.
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DOI 10.1017/s0140525x98290406
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