Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):85-85 (1998)
User intentions invoked to account for the distinctive way in which public-language natural-kind terms gather their extensions are inapplicable in the case of Millikan's substance concepts. I suggest that theoretical justification is preferable and available and raise exploratory questions about the applicability of the notion of substance concepts to the genesis of self concepts.
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