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How Much Realism? Evolved Thinkers and Normative Concepts1
Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:33 (2011)
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Darwin and moral realism: Survival of the iffiest.Knut Olav Skarsaune - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):229-243.
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