Transcendental Idealism

Idealistic Studies 18 (3):247-265 (1988)
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Abstract

“By transcendental idealism,” Kant explains, “I mean the doctrine that appearances are … representations only, not things in themselves, and that time and space are therefore only sensible forms of our intuition, not determinations given as existing by themselves, nor conditions of objects viewed as things in themselves” ; “… by our sensibility … we do not apprehend [things in themselves] in any fashion whatsoever”. The phenomenality of the objective realm, according to Kant, follows from the fact that the principles of objective knowledge, which demarcate that realm, have validity only for us.

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Mark Glouberman
Kwantlen Polytechnic University

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