What epistemologists of testimony should learn from philosophers of science

Synthese 199 (5-6):12541-12559 (2021)
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Abstract

The thesis of this paper is that, if it is construed individualistically, epistemic justification does not capture the conditions that philosophers of science would impose on justified belief in a scientific hypothesis. The difficulty arises from beliefs acquired through testimony. From this I derive a lesson that epistemologists generally, and epistemologists of testimony in particular, should learn from philosophers of science: we ought to repudiate epistemic individualism and move towards a more fully social epistemology.

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Sanford Goldberg
Northwestern University

References found in this work

Knowledge in a social world.Alvin I. Goldman - 1991 - New York: Oxford University Press.
True Enough.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2017 - Cambridge: MIT Press.
The Fate of Knowledge.Helen E. Longino - 2001 - Princeton University Press.
The Fate of Knowledge.Helen E. Longino - 2002 - Princeton University Press.

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