Authors
Jeremy Goodman
University of Southern California
Abstract
In a series of recent papers, Timothy Williamson has argued for the surprising conclusion that there are cases in which you know a proposition in spite of its being overwhelmingly improbable given what you know that you know it. His argument relies on certain formal models of our imprecise knowledge of the values of perceptible and measurable magnitudes. This paper suggests an alternative class of models that do not predict this sort of improbable knowing. I show that such models are motivated by independently plausible principles in the epistemology of perception, the epistemology of estimation, and concerning the connection between knowledge and justified belief.
Keywords Perceptual knowledge  Epistemic probability
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DOI 10.1080/0020174x.2013.775013
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References found in this work BETA

Unreasonable Knowledge.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):1-21.
Very Improbable Knowing.Timothy Williamson - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):971-999.
Better Than Mere Knowledge? The Function of Sensory Awareness.Mark Johnston - 2006 - In John Hawthorne & Tamar Gendler (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 260--290.
Attention and Mental Paint1.Ned Block - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):23-63.
Logic, Metalogic and Neutrality.Timothy Williamson - 2013 - Erkenntnis 79 (Suppl 2):211-231.

View all 23 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Justification, knowledge, and normality.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1593-1609.
Taking a Chance on KK.Jeremy Goodman & Bernhard Salow - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):183-196.
Higher-Order Evidence.Kevin Dorst - forthcoming - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook for the Philosophy of Evidence. Routledge.
The normality of error.Sam Carter & Simon Goldstein - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (8):2509-2533.
Higher Order Ignorance Inside the Margins.Sam Carter - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1789-1806.

View all 15 citations / Add more citations

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