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  1. On Risk and Rationality.Brad Armendt - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S6):1-9.
    It is widely held that the influence of risk on rational decisions is not entirely explained by the shape of an agent’s utility curve. Buchak (Erkenntnis, 2013, Risk and rationality, Oxford University Press, Oxford, in press) presents an axiomatic decision theory, risk-weighted expected utility theory (REU), in which decision weights are the agent’s subjective probabilities modified by his risk-function r. REU is briefly described, and the global applicability of r is discussed. Rabin’s (Econometrica 68:1281–1292, 2000) calibration theorem strongly suggests that (...)
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  2. Henri Poincare and Bruno de Finetti: Conventions and Scientific Reasoning.S. B. - 1997 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 28 (4):657-679.
    In his account of probable reasoning, Poincare used the concept, or at least the language, of conventions. In particular, he claimed that the prior probabilities essential for inverse probable reasoning are determined conventionally. This paper investigates, in the light of Poincare's well known claim about the conventionality of metric geometry, what this could mean, and how it is related to other views about the determination of prior probabilities. Particular attention is paid to the similarities and differences between Poincare's conventionalism as (...)
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  3. Uncertainty and the de Finetti Tables.Jean Baratgin, David E. Over & Guy Politzer - 2013 - Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):308-328.
    The new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning adopts a Bayesian, or prob- abilistic, model for studying human reasoning. Contrary to the traditional binary approach based on truth functional logic, with its binary values of truth and falsity, a third value that represents uncertainty can be introduced in the new paradigm. A variety of three-valued truth table systems are available in the formal literature, including one proposed by de Finetti. We examine the descriptive adequacy of these systems for natural language (...)
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  4. Decision Theory and Rationality.Jos Luis Bermdez - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    Decision Theory and Rationality offers a challenging new interpretation of a key theoretical tool in the human and social sciences. This accessible book argues, contrary to orthodoxy in politics, economics, and management science, that decision theory cannot provide a theory of rationality.
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  5. Can It Be Rational to Have Faith?Lara Buchak - 2012 - In Jake Chandler & Victoria Harrison (eds.), Probability in the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press. pp. 225.
    This paper provides an account of what it is to have faith in a proposition p, in both religious and mundane contexts. It is argued that faith in p doesn’t require adopting a degree of belief that isn’t supported by one’s evidence but rather it requires terminating one’s search for further evidence and acting on the supposition that p. It is then shown, by responding to a formal result due to I.J. Good, that doing so can be rational in a (...)
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  6. Referentialism and the Objects of Credence: A Reply to Braun.David J. Chalmers - 2016 - Mind 125 (498):499-510.
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  7. Frege's Puzzle and the Objects of Credence.David J. Chalmers - 2011 - Mind 120 (479):587-635.
    The objects of credence are the entities to which credences are assigned for the purposes of a successful theory of credence. I use cases akin to Frege's puzzle to argue against referentialism about credence : the view that objects of credence are determined by the objects and properties at which one's credence is directed. I go on to develop a non-referential account of the objects of credence in terms of sets of epistemically possible scenarios.
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  8. Forecasted Risk Taking in Youth: Evidence for a Bounded-Rationality Perspective.Mandeep K. Dhami & David R. Mandel - 2012 - Synthese 189 (S1):161-171.
    This research examined whether youth's forecasted risk taking is best predicted by a compensatory (namely, subjective expected utility) or non-compensatory (e.g., single-factor) model. Ninety youth assessed the importance of perceived benefits, importance of perceived drawbacks, subjective probability of benefits, and subjective probability of drawbacks for 16 risky behaviors clustered evenly into recreational and health/safety domains. In both domains, there was strong support for a noncompensatory model in which only the perceived importance of the benefits of engaging in a risky behavior (...)
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  9. A Theory of Bayesian Groups.Franz Dietrich - manuscript
    A group is often construed as a single agent with its own probabilistic beliefs (credences), which are obtained by aggregating those of the individuals, for instance through averaging. In their celebrated contribution “Groupthink”, Russell et al. (2015) apply the Bayesian paradigm to groups by requiring group credences to undergo a Bayesian revision whenever new information is learnt, i.e., whenever the individual credences undergo a Bayesian revision based on this information. Bayesians should often strengthen this requirement by extending it to non-public (...)
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  10. Eine komparative Theorie der Stärke von Argumenten.Georg J. W. Dorn - 2005 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):34–43.
    This article presents a comparative theory of subjective argument strength simple enough for application. Using the axioms and corollaries of the theory, anyone with an elementary knowledge of logic and probability theory can produce an at least minimally rational ranking of any set of arguments according to their subjective strength, provided that the arguments in question are descriptive ones in standard form. The basic idea is that the strength of argument A as seen by person x is a function of (...)
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  11. A Representation Theorem for Frequently Irrational Agents.Edward Elliott - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (5):467-506.
    The standard representation theorem for expected utility theory tells us that if a subject’s preferences conform to certain axioms, then she can be represented as maximising her expected utility given a particular set of credences and utilities—and, moreover, that having those credences and utilities is the only way that she could be maximising her expected utility. However, the kinds of agents these theorems seem apt to tell us anything about are highly idealised, being always probabilistically coherent with infinitely precise degrees (...)
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  12. Ramsey Without Ethical Neutrality: A New Representation Theorem.Edward Elliott - 2017 - Mind 126 (501):1-51.
    Frank Ramsey's ‘Truth and Probability’ sketches a proposal for the empirical measurement of credences, along with a corresponding set of axioms for a representation theorem intended to characterize the preference conditions under which this measurement process is applicable. There are several features of Ramsey's formal system which make it attractive and worth developing. However, in specifying his measurement process and his axioms, Ramsey introduces the notion of an ethically neutral proposition, the assumed existence of which plays a key role throughout (...)
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  13. Ratings and Confirmation.Joseph S. Fulda - 1988 - Quality and Quantity 22 (4):435-438.
    We present a linear formalism which makes explicit and precise the confirming effect of independent multiple observers and repeated trials on composite ratings, taking as parameters quantitative estimates of the subjective inputs discussed. -/- Note that the subjective probability used here is so used to study the past not predict the future and is rather limited to what has been called in artificial intelligence "certainty factors," which are arbitrary, or, more well-known, the arbitrary values ascribed to predicates in fuzzy "logic." (...)
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  14. A Simpler and More Realistic Subjective Decision Theory.Haim Gaifman & Yang Liu - forthcoming - Synthese.
    In his classic book develops a formal system of rational decision making. It is based on (i) a set of possible states of the world, (ii) a set of consequences, (iii) a set of acts, which are functions from states to consequences, and (iv) a preference relation over the acts, which represents the preferences of an idealized rational agent. The goal and the culmination of the enterprise is a representation theorem: Any preference relation that satisfies certain arguably acceptable postulates determines (...)
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  15. Conjunction, Disjunction and Iterated Conditioning of Conditional Events.Angelo Gilio & Giuseppe Sanfilippo - 2013 - In R. Kruse (ed.), Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing. Springer.
    Starting from a recent paper by S. Kaufmann, we introduce a notion of conjunction of two conditional events and then we analyze it in the setting of coherence. We give a representation of the conjoined conditional and we show that this new object is a conditional random quantity, whose set of possible values normally contains the probabilities assessed for the two conditional events. We examine some cases of logical dependencies, where the conjunction is a conditional event; moreover, we give the (...)
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  16. Inexact Knowledge Without Improbable Knowing.Jeremy Goodman - 2013 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (1):30-53.
    In a series of recent papers, Timothy Williamson has argued for the surprising conclusion that there are cases in which you know a proposition in spite of its being overwhelmingly improbable given what you know that you know it. His argument relies on certain formal models of our imprecise knowledge of the values of perceptible and measurable magnitudes. This paper suggests an alternative class of models that do not predict this sort of improbable knowing. I show that such models are (...)
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  17. Review: Subjective Probability. [REVIEW]Ian Hacking - 1966 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 16 (64):334 - 339.
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  18. Consequentialist Foundations for Expected Utility.Peter J. Hammond - 1988 - Theory and Decision 25 (1):25-78.
    Behaviour norms are considered for decision trees which allow both objective probabilities and uncertain states of the world with unknown probabilities. Terminal nodes have consequences in a given domain. Behaviour is required to be consistent in subtrees. Consequentialist behaviour, by definition, reveals a consequence choice function independent of the structure of the decision tree. It implies that behaviour reveals a revealed preference ordering satisfying both the independence axiom and a novel form of sure-thing principle. Continuous consequentialist behaviour must be expected (...)
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  19. The Counterpart Principle of Analogical Support by Structural Similarity.A. Hill & J. B. Paris - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S6):1-16.
    We propose and investigate an Analogy Principle in the context of Unary Inductive Logic based on a notion of support by structural similarity which is often employed to motivate scientific conjectures.
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  20. An Analogy Principle in Inductive Logic.A. Hill & J. B. Paris - 2013 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 164 (12):1293-1321.
    We propose an Analogy Principle in the context of Unary Inductive Logic and characterize the probability functions which satisfy it. In particular in the case of a language with just two predicates the probability functions satisfying this principle correspond to solutions of Skyrmsʼ ‘Wheel of Fortune’.
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  21. Reasoning by Analogy in Inductive Logic.Alexandra Hill & J. B. Paris - 2011 - In Michal Peliš & Vít Punčochář (eds.), The Logica Yearbook. College Publications. pp. 63--76.
  22. The Theory of Spectrum Exchangeability.E. Howarth & J. B. Paris - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (1):108-130.
  23. Principles of Remembering and Forgetting.E. Howarth & J. B. Paris - 2014 - Logique Et Analyse 57 (228):489-511.
    We propose two principles of inductive reasoning related to how observed information is handled by conditioning, and justify why they may be said to represent aspects of rational reasoning. A partial classification is given of the probability functions which satisfy these principles.
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  24. An Examination of the SEP Candidate Analogical Inference Rule Within Pure Inductive Logic.E. Howarth, J. B. Paris & A. Vencovská - 2016 - Journal of Applied Logic 14:22-45.
  25. Modelling Uncertain Inference.Colin Howson - 2012 - Synthese 186 (2):475-492.
    Kyburg’s opposition to the subjective Bayesian theory, and in particular to its advocates’ indiscriminate and often questionable use of Dutch Book arguments, is documented and much of it strongly endorsed. However, it is argued that an alternative version, proposed by both de Finetti at various times during his long career, and by Ramsey, is less vulnerable to Kyburg’s misgivings. This is a logical interpretation of the formalism, one which, it is argued, is both more natural and also avoids other, widely-made (...)
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  26. Subjective Probability as Sampling Propensity.Thomas Icard - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4):863-903.
    Subjective probability plays an increasingly important role in many fields concerned with human cognition and behavior. Yet there have been significant criticisms of the idea that probabilities could actually be represented in the mind. This paper presents and elaborates a view of subjective probability as a kind of sampling propensity associated with internally represented generative models. The resulting view answers to some of the most well known criticisms of subjective probability, and is also supported by empirical work in neuroscience and (...)
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  27. Probability as a Guide in Life.Jr Henry E. Kyburg - 2001 - The Monist 84 (2):135 - 152.
    Bishop Butler, [Butler, 1736], said that probability was the very guide of life. But what interpretations of probability can serve this function? It isn't hard to see that empirical (frequency) views won't do, and many recent writers—for example John Earman, who has said that Bayesianism is "the only game in town"—have been persuaded by various dutch book arguments that only subjective probability will perform the function required. We will defend the thesis that probability construed in this way offers very little (...)
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  28. Bayesianism and Reliable Scientific Inquiry.Cory Juhl - 1993 - Philosophy of Science 60 (2):302-319.
    The inductive reliability of Bayesian methods is explored. The first result presented shows that for any solvable inductive problem of a general type, there exists a subjective prior which yields a Bayesian inductive method that solves the problem, although not all subjective priors give rise to a successful inductive method for the problem. The second result shows that the same does not hold for computationally bounded agents, so that Bayesianism is "inductively incomplete" for such agents. Finally a consistency proof shows (...)
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  29. When Several Bayesians Agree That There Will Be No Reasoning to a Foregone Conclusion.Joseph B. Kadane, Mark J. Schervish & Teddy Seidenfeld - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (3):289.
    When can a Bayesian investigator select an hypothesis H and design an experiment (or a sequence of experiments) to make certain that, given the experimental outcome(s), the posterior probability of H will be lower than its prior probability? We report an elementary result which establishes sufficient conditions under which this reasoning to a foregone conclusion cannot occur. Through an example, we discuss how this result extends to the perspective of an onlooker who agrees with the investigator about the statistical model (...)
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  30. BELIEF IN CAUSATION: ONE APPLICATION OF CARNAP's INDUCTIVE LOGIC.Yusuke Kaneko - 2012 - Academic Research International 3 (1).
    This paper takes two tasks. The one is elaborating on the relationship of inductive logic with decision theory to which later Carnap planned to apply his system (§§1-7); this is a surveying side of this article. The other is revealing the property of our prediction of the future, subjectivity (§§8-11); this is its philosophical aspect. They are both discussed under the name of belief in causation. Belief in causation is a kind of “degree of belief” born about the causal effect (...)
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  31. Second Order Inductive Logic and Wilmers' Principle.M. S. Kließ & J. B. Paris - 2014 - Journal of Applied Logic 12 (4):462-476.
  32. Second Order Inductive Logic and Wilmers' Principle.M. S. Kliess & J. B. Paris - 2014 - Journal of Applied Logic 12 (4):462-476.
    We extend the framework of Inductive Logic to Second Order languages and introduce Wilmers' Principle, a rational principle for probability functions on Second Order languages. We derive a representation theorem for functions satisfying this principle and investigate its relationship to the first order principles of Regularity and Super Regularity.
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  33. Predicate Exchangeability and Language Invariance in Pure Inductive Logic.M. S. Kliess & J. B. Paris - 2014 - Logique Et Analyse 57 (228):513-540.
    In Pure Inductive Logic, the rational principle of Predicate Exchangeability states that permuting the predicates in a given language L and replacing each occurrence of a predicate in an L-sentence phi according to this permutation should not change our belief in the truth of phi. In this paper we study when a prior probability function w on a purely unary language L satisfying Predicate Exchangeability also satisfies the principle of Unary Language Invariance.
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  34. A Survey of Some Recent Results on Spectrum Exchangeability in Polyadic Inductive Logic.J. Landes, J. B. Paris & A. Vencovská - 2011 - Synthese 181 (S1):19 - 47.
    We give a unified account of some results in the development of Polyadic Inductive Logic in the last decade with particular reference to the Principle of Spectrum Exchangeability, its consequences for Instantial Relevance, Language Invariance and Johnson's Sufficientness Principle, and the corresponding de Finetti style representation theorems.
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  35. Partial Beliefs and Rational Decision Making: Some Problems in the Theory of Subjective Probability.Adele Easton Laslie - 1978 - Dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University
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  36. Social Preference Under Twofold Uncertainty.Philippe Mongin & Marcus Pivato - manuscript
    We investigate the conflict between the ex ante and ex post criteria of social welfare in a new framework of individual and social decisions, which distinguishes between two sources of uncertainty, here interpreted as an objective and a subjective source respectively. This framework makes it possible to endow the individuals and society not only with ex ante and ex post preferences, as is usually done, but also with interim preferences of two kinds, and correspondingly, to introduce interim forms of the (...)
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  37. An Axiomatic Derivation of Subjective Probability, Utility, and Evaluation Functions.Roger B. Myerson - 1979 - Theory and Decision 11 (4):339-352.
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  38. Deterministic Laws and Epistemic Chances.Wayne C. Myrvold - 2012 - In Yemima Ben-Menahem & Meir Hemmo (eds.), Probability in Physics. Springer. pp. 73--85.
    In this paper, a concept of chance is introduced that is compatible with deterministic physical laws, yet does justice to our use of chance-talk in connection with typical games of chance. We take our cue from what Poincaré called "the method of arbitrary functions," and elaborate upon a suggestion made by Savage in connection with this. Comparison is made between this notion of chance, and David Lewis' conception.
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  39. The Incoherence of Agreeing to Disagree.Robert F. Nau - 1995 - Theory and Decision 39 (3):219-239.
  40. Combining Analogical Support in Pure Inductive Logic.J. B. Paris & A. Vencovská - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (2):401-419.
    We investigate the relative probabilistic support afforded by the combination of two analogies based on possibly different, structural similarity within the context of Pure Inductive Logic and under the assumption of Language Invariance. We show that whilst repeated analogies grounded on the same structural similarity only strengthen the probabilistic support this need not be the case when combining analogies based on different structural similarities. That is, two analogies may provide less support than each would individually.
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  41. Ancient Indian Logic and Analogy.J. B. Paris & A. Vencovska - 2017 - In S. Ghosh & S. Prasad (eds.), Logic and its Applications, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 10119. Springer. pp. 198-210.
    B.K.Matilal, and earlier J.F.Staal, have suggested a reading of the `Nyaya five limb schema' (also sometimes referred to as the Indian Schema or Hindu Syllogism) from Gotama's Nyaya-Sutra in terms of a binary occurrence relation. In this paper we provide a rational justification of a version of this reading as Analogical Reasoning within the framework of Polyadic Pure Inductive Logic.
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  42. Combining Analogical Support in Pure Inductive Logic.J. B. Paris & A. Vencovska - 2016 - Erkenntnis (2):01-19.
    We investigate the relative probabilistic support afforded by the combination of two analogies based on possibly different, structural similarity (as opposed to e.g. shared predicates) within the context of Pure Inductive Logic and under the assumption of Language Invariance. We show that whilst repeated analogies grounded on the same structural similarity only strengthen the probabilistic support this need not be the case when combining analogies based on different structural similarities. That is, two analogies may provide less support than each would (...)
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  43. Pure Inductive Logic.J. B. Paris & A. Vencovska - 2015 - Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
    Pure Inductive Logic is the study of rational probability treated as a branch of mathematical logic. This monograph, the first devoted to this approach, brings together the key results from the past seventy years, plus the main contributions of the authors and their collaborators over the last decade, to present a comprehensive account of the discipline within a single unified context.
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  44. Symmetry in Polyadic Inductive Logic.J. B. Paris & A. Vencovská - 2012 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 21 (2):189-216.
    A family of symmetries of polyadic inductive logic are described which in turn give rise to the purportedly rational Permutation Invariance Principle stating that a rational assignment of probabilities should respect these symmetries. An equivalent, and more practical, version of this principle is then derived.
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  45. A Note on Irrelevance in Inductive Logic.Jeff B. Paris & Alena Vencovská - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (3):357 - 370.
    We consider two formalizations of the notion of irrelevance as a rationality principle within the framework of (Carnapian) Inductive Logic: Johnson's Sufficientness Principle, JSP, which is classically important because it leads to Carnap's influential Continuum of Inductive Methods and the recently proposed Weak Irrelevance Principle, WIP. We give a complete characterization of the language invariant probability functions satisfying WIP which generalizes the Nix-Paris Continuum. We argue that the derivation of two very disparate families of inductive methods from alternative perceptions of (...)
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  46. II—Pluralism About Belief States.Richard Pettigrew - 2015 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1):187-204.
    With his Humean thesis on belief, Leitgeb seeks to say how beliefs and credences ought to interact with one another. To argue for this thesis, he enumerates the roles beliefs must play and the properties they must have if they are to play them, together with norms that beliefs and credences intuitively must satisfy. He then argues that beliefs can play these roles and satisfy these norms if, and only if, they are related to credences in the way set out (...)
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  47. Epistemic Utility Arguments for Probabilism.Richard Pettigrew - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia.
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  48. Deductive Reasoning Under Uncertainty: A Water Tank Analogy.Guy Politzer - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (3):479-506.
    This paper describes a cubic water tank equipped with a movable partition receiving various amounts of liquid used to represent joint probability distributions. This device is applied to the investigation of deductive inferences under uncertainty. The analogy is exploited to determine by qualitative reasoning the limits in probability of the conclusion of twenty basic deductive arguments often used as benchmark problems by the various theoretical approaches to reasoning under uncertainty. The probability bounds imposed by the premises on the conclusion are (...)
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  49. Probabilistic Belief Contraction.Raghav Ramachandran, Arthur Ramer & Abhaya C. Nayak - 2012 - Minds and Machines 22 (4):325-351.
    Probabilistic belief contraction has been a much neglected topic in the field of probabilistic reasoning. This is due to the difficulty in establishing a reasonable reversal of the effect of Bayesian conditionalization on a probabilistic distribution. We show that indifferent contraction, a solution proposed by Ramer to this problem through a judicious use of the principle of maximum entropy, is a probabilistic version of a full meet contraction. We then propose variations of indifferent contraction, using both the Shannon entropy measure (...)
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  50. Bruno de Finetti.I. Inductive Reasoning - 1970 - In Paul Weingartner & Gerhard Zecha (eds.), Induction, Physics, and Ethics. Dordrecht: Reidel. pp. 3.
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