The social constitution of action: Objectivity and explanation

Philosophy of the Social Sciences 20 (2):195-207 (1990)
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Abstract

It is argued in this article that human actions may be said to be socially constituted : as being behavior that is constituted as human action by social relations and by participant agent and collective representations of behavior. In contrast to recent social constructionist accounts, it is argued that the social constitution of action does not pose any threat to the objectivity of classification or explanation in social psychological science. It does mark some significant ontological differences between natural and social psychological phenomena that have implications for the university and generality, but not the adequacy, of explanations of socially constituted human actions.

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John Greenwood
CUNY Graduate Center

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