Philosophy of Science 67 (2):301-315 (2000)
Terence Horgan and John Tienson claim that folk psychological laws are different in kind from basic physical laws in at least two ways: first, physical laws do not possess the kind of ceteris paribus qualifications possessed by folk psychological laws, which means the two types of laws have different logical forms; and second, applied physical laws are best thought of as being about an idealized world and folk psychological laws about the actual world. I argue that Horgan and Tienson have not made a persuasive case for either of the preceding views
|Keywords||Ceteris Paribus Folk Laws Physics Science Horgan, T Tienson, J|
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